The is a guest note by Fadi Elsalameen, publisher of the Palestine Note.

For the past several years Palestine Prime Minister Salam Fayyad's name on the streets of the West Bank and Gaza has become synonymous with the words credibility, honesty, and transparency.

His hard work on building and reforming Palestinian institutions has paid off: Palestinians see him as a serious leader that can deliver to his people with or without the Israelis.

He has raised the bar of leadership so high that officials in the Fatah movement are feeling extremely uncomfortable and challenged. A senior Fatah leader and member of its central committee told me, last week, while the Brooking Institutions' Saban Forum was taking place in Jerusalem "everyone comes to Ramallah to see Fayyad; they add us and Abu Mazen on their programs just as an excuse."

The Fatah official was almost right: the Saban Forum did send a delegation to Ramallah, but they didn't add him or Abu Mazen on the schedule, they only met with Prime Minister Fayyad.

This is the right approach: if the Palestinian politicians remain in internal political quagmire, the world should pay attention to those who are building in Palestine and help them build.

The international community should deal directly with the new style of leadership that is emerging in Palestine. It is the wish of the Palestinian people. The cult of self-appointed personalities that have done nothing for the Palestinians other than use their cause to create prestige for themselves and their families should be ousted. Everyone on the streets of the West Bank and Gaza will agree.

Why can't they retire from political life, join universities in Palestine, and write books for the next generation to learn from their mistakes? Jibril Rijoub is one example of a Fatah politician that changed his useless political existence into a popular and productive head of sports. He is successfully building sports teams, and stadiums and giving sports a whole new meaning in Palestine.

When Arafat passed away, he took with him his style of leadership, and left the people with Abu Mazen and the personalities surrounding him as the figures of the transition period that followed.

That is why soon after people voted for Hamas. They did it for two reasons: to punish Fatah for its corruption, and out of a deep desire for change and improvement they wanted to see if Hamas could deliver what Fatah couldn't.

Alas, to most Palestinians, Hamas and Fatah are both incompetent at this point. Nothing has been accomplished by either party to advance the cause of the Palestinians. In fact, the Palestinians are years behind.

Their PA and Fatah leadership enjoys traveling and shopping on trips abroad.

Meanwhile, Hamas is implementing Talibani backward policies such as Hijab in schools, and demanding women judges to cover in courts. Both Fatah and Hamas supporters are dismayed with their party leadership.

We must take note of an important change that is occurring in Palestine. Anyone on the streets will tell you Salam Fayyad is always visiting us, while Abbas and his people spend more days outside Palestine than inside.

Salam Fayyad represents the new Palestinian style of leadership that will deliver the Palestinian State. He is in touch with his people. He has visited almost every town in the West Bank. He puts on his shorts and runs in marathons for the handicapped, and when tragic personal events strike simple people in Palestine he calls them on the phone to elevate their spirits, promises to visit them personally, and then he actually does visit.

Fayyad's is a promising example of leadership. The world owes it to the Palestinian people -- who have yet to see a bright day in their lives -- to support this kind of leadership and give it a chance to succeed. The people are ready to elect it and give it a mandate to implement its vision, and the world, especially the Arab world, must come through and help it deliver.

-- Fadi Elsalameen

Europe is correct to be skeptical of Turkey's European Union accession prospects - but Brussels should be wary not because Turkey is not "part of Europe," but because its democracy remains fragile and its liberalism incomplete.

The most obvious evidence of Turkey's uneven progress is the ongoing Ergenekon investigation that continues to roil the country. The criminal case has led to the arrests of 194 individuals suspected of being members of Turkey's derin devlet (Deep State) - a murky, extra-legal organization that is suspected of having close ties to the military and the bureaucracy.

At first glance, the investigation might be considered a healthy development akin to Italy's "clean hands" investigation in the 1990s, which somewhat successfully purged the Italian state of corruption.

But a closer examination of the investigation suggests that a higher degree of skepticism is in order.

In a paper for the Central Asia - Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program at Johns Hopkins' School for Advanced International Studies, long-time Istanbul denizen and analyst of Turkey Gareth Jenkins describes in painstaking detail how the investigation is best understood as the result of wild conspiracy theories combined with a partisan effort to weaken the secular establishment, the government's chief rival for political power.

The paper, "Between Fact and Fantasy: Turkey's Ergenekon Investigation," can be read here.

Here is part of Jenkins' alarming conclusion:

Even the most cursory objective examination of the investigation raises deeply disturbing questions, which multiply and intensify the more closely the alleged evidence in the case is examined....

[Judicial concerns include] the manner in which the investigation as a whole has been handled, the disregard for due process, the prosecutors' inability or unwillingness to understand the numerous contradictions in the indictments, the creative interpretation and occasional apparent manipulation of what little evidence is adduced, the arbitrary nature of many of the police raids, the length of time some of the suspects have been detained in prison without being formally charged, the frequency with which materials related to the case or its critics have been leaked into the public domain, and the subsequent suspicion that the investigation has become tainted by political motives.

Jenkins' report raises serious allegations and Europeans would be correct to raise concerns. Indeed, the accession negotiations are meant to encourage Turkey to adopt liberal reforms, while discouraging illiberal governmental actions.

It is surprising, therefore, that the Ergenekon case is nearly absent from the European Commission's most recent progress report on Turkey, published last month (two months after Jenkins' report was published).

Here is what the 94 page (single-spaced) report has to say about the Ergenekon case.

Investigations into the alleged criminal network Ergenekon continued. Charges include attempting to overthrow the government and to instigate armed riots. Ammunition and weapons were discovered in the course of the investigation. A first trial, which started in October 2008, is ongoing. A second indictment, covering 56 suspects including three retired generals and a former commander of the gendarmerie, was submitted to court in March 2009. A third indictment covering 52 suspects was presented to the Court in July. The cases concerning these two indictments are discussed in one single trial, which started in July 2009 and is ongoing. This is the first case in Turkey to probe into a coup attempt and the most extensive investigation ever on an alleged criminal network aiming at destabilising the democratic institutions. Furthermore, for the first time a former Chief of Staff testified voluntarily as a witness. Concerns have been raised about effective judicial guarantees for all the suspects....

Overall, the investigation of the alleged criminal network Ergenekon has led to serious criminal charges, involving military officers. This case is an opportunity for Turkey to strengthen confidence in the proper functioning of its democratic institutions and the rule of law. It is important that proceedings in this context fully respect the due process of law, in particular the rights of the defendants....

During a press briefing in April, the Chief of General Staff made comments on the Ergenekon case and on the indictment, thus putting the judiciary under pressure. Some senior members of the armed forces lent support to military personnel standing trial.

In the context of Turkey's judiciary, there is another reference.

High-profile cases raised concerns about the quality of the investigations. Furthermore, there is a need to improve the working relationship between the police and the gendarmerie on the one hand and the judiciary on the other. Reports by civil society organisations and statements by witnesses, in particular regarding the alleged criminal network Ergenekon, the murder of three Protestants in Malatya and the murder of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink cases, highlighted these concerns in specific cases....There have been reports of violations of procedural rights of the accused in the judicial proceedings regarding the alleged criminal network Ergenekon.

Finally,

Overall, some progress has been made, in particular on limiting the jurisdiction of military courts. However, senior members of the armed forces have made statements on issues going beyond their remit, and full parliamentary oversight of defense expenditure needs to be ensured. The alleged involvement of military personnel in anti-government activities, disclosed by the investigation on Ergenekon, raises serious concerns.

Nearly all of the report's analysis of the Ergenekon investigation focuses on the case's potential to strengthen civilian political power and weaken the power of the military. This has been a European objective for a long time, but it is not the only lens through which the Ergenekon investigations should be analyzed.

On the judicial concerns that Jenkins raises in his paper, the European Union Commission report notes merely that "concerns have been raised about effective judicial guarantees for all the suspects." It does not elaborate at all.

Whether or not Jenkins' analysis is entirely correct, it certainly suggests that the investigations merit further attention.

Europe should start paying attention, but it is important that it pay attention in the right way. Populist political campaigners should not use the investigation as evidence that Turkey is not "part of Europe" and never can be. Instead, Brussels should conduct as thorough an investigation as possible, make its results known, indicate that the investigation must be conducted in accordance with liberal norms, and insist that reforms must be implemented before Turkey can join its Union.

-- Ben Katcher

With all of the talk and controversy about the war in Afghanistan in the past months, it has been easy for many to forget that despite the reduction in violence brought about partly by the 2007 troop surge, Iraq remains troubled. Violence is on the rise again, and last month's deadly bombings showed the continued threat that insurgent groups pose to the Iraq's government and people.

Moreover, unresolved political questions continue to inhibit Iraq's transition toward stability and government accountability. The passage of a long-awaited election law Sunday elicited relief from many in the region and the U.S., only to be swept away when Iraq's Sunni Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi vetoed the law Wednesday.

The veto appears to be an attempt to gain more parliamentary seats for Iraq's minorities and Iraqis living abroad, and will likely delay the parliamentary elections scheduled for January 18. This setback, coupled with lingering security fears, could potentially delay the withdrawal of the bulk of American troops from Iraq, scheduled to begin in 2010.

The Special Representative in Iraq for U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, Ad Melkert, will discuss his insights about the present situation and future of Iraq from 4:00 pm- 5:30 pm today at the New America Foundation.

The event will stream live here at The Washington Note.

-- Andrew Lebovich

This is an audio clip of an extensive discussion with Brian Lehrer on WNYC National Public Radio today about Barack Obama's options in Afghanistan.

I am pleased and applaud President Obama for requiring his advisers to come to him with plans including serious "exit strategies."

Lehrer properly noted that I am a skeptic of a surge of forces into Afghanistan now and lined up some callers who were proponents of committing greater resources toward the problem.

I thought that this was an excellent exchange -- and covered the terrain well. Brian Lehrer knows how to expertly peel back the onion skin of these complex national security issues.

-- Steve Clemons

I interviewed former UK Ambassador to the United States Sir Christopher Meyer on his new book Getting Our Way: Five Hundred Years Of International Diplomacy. I have begun the book -- and it's a terrific review of five centuries of the world's big moments and how competitive statecraft in very difficult circumstances turned out. Here is a review from The Guardian.

Meyer has important insights into Afghanistan, stating that the "penny is dropping in London that the democracy project in Afghanistan is a fool's errand." He is increasingly of the view that the entire Afghanistan exercise is a disastrous mess without any "clarity" of objective. He offers a logic-led critique of matters rather than just asserting the Afghanistan War is doomed.

Meyer wrote one of the major insider accounts of the lead up to the Iraq War, reporting from private memos and other personal observations about the Tony Blair-George Bush relationship. I recommend DC Confidential: The Controversial Memoirs of Britain's Ambassador to the U.S. at the Time of 9/11 and the Run-Up to the Iraq War.

Fascinating diplomat -- and great interview. Hope you find it useful.

Leaving Italy this morning -- and heading back to Washington.

On other fronts, for those who want advance word, I will be chairing a meeting at the New America Foundation in Washington, right after I land at Dulles, titled "Iraq: The New Forgotten War" with a distinguished former Dutch political leader, Ad Melkert, who was former executive director of the World Bank and who now serves as Special Representative for the UN Secretary General in Iraq.

Melkert attracted a lot of headlines as he headed a key committee that wrestled with then President Paul Wolfowitz over various ethics questions -- ultimately resulting in Wolfowitz's departure from the Bank.

The meeting will stream live here at The Washington Note and also at the website of the New America Foundation starting at about 4:15 pm EST (so anyone around the world can watch). Those in DC are welcome to attend -- and more information on logistics is here.

-- Steve Clemons

This is a priceless exchange between journalist "Matt" and State Department spokesman Ian Kelly. Who is Matt?

Terrific job on his part -- not so terrific on George Mitchell's team's part. . .

Daily Press Briefings : Daily Press Briefing - November 17
Tue, 17 Nov 2009 14:29:30 -0600
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009/nov/132024.htm

Ian Kelly
Department Spokesman
Daily Press Briefing
Washington, DC
November 17, 2009

QUESTION: On the peace process, Israel has approved today the construction of 900 new housing units in East Jerusalem. How do you view this approval at this specific time?

MR. KELLY: Well, I think, Michel, you've heard us say many times that we believe that neither party should engage in any kind of actions that could unilaterally preempt or appear to preempt negotiations. And I think that we find the Jerusalem Planning Committee's decision to move forward on the approval of the - approval process for the expansion of Gilo in Jerusalem as dismaying.

This is at a time when we're working to re-launch negotiations, and we believe that these actions make it more difficult for our efforts to succeed. So we object to this, and we object to other Israeli practices in Jerusalem related to housing, including the continuing pattern of evictions and demolitions of Palestinian homes.

And - just to repeat what we've said all along, our position on Jerusalem is clear. We believe that the - that Jerusalem is a permanent status issue that must be resolved through negotiations between the two parties.

QUESTION: Can you tell us, did this come up in Ambassador Mitchell's meetings in London yesterday? Apparently, we were told that he met an advisor to Netanyahu, asked them to not permit these new buildings, and then that request was flatly turned down.

MR. KELLY: Yeah. Andy, I just don't want to get into the substance of these negotiations. They're sensitive. I think you've seen the Israeli - some Israeli press reports that did report that this was raised in the meetings. This is - I mean, these kinds of unilateral actions are exactly the kind of actions that we think that both sides should refrain from at a time when we're trying to start the negotiations again. But I don't want to get into the substance of the discussions yesterday in London.

QUESTION: Would you steer us away from not believing the Israeli press reports?

MR. KELLY: I just don't want to get into the substance. I'm not going to steer you one way or the other on it.

QUESTION: Where's Senator Mitchell today?

QUESTION: How long is the U.S. going to continue to tolerate Israel's violation of international law? I mean, soon it's not even going to be possible - there's not going to be any land left for the Palestinians to establish an independent state.

MR. KELLY: Well, again, this is a - we understand the Israeli point of view about Jerusalem. But we think that all sides right now, at this time when we're expending such intense efforts to try and get the two sides to sit down, that we should refrain from these actions, like this decision to move forward on an approval process for more housing units in East Jerusalem.

QUESTION: But should U.S. inaction, or in response to Israel's actions, then be interpreted as some sort of about-face in policy - the President turning his back on the promises he's made to the Palestinians?

MR. KELLY: You're - okay, you're using language that I wouldn't use. I mean, again, our focus is to get these negotiations started. We're calling on both parties to refrain from actions, from - and from rhetoric that would impede this process. It's a challenging time, and we just need to focus on what's important here, and that's --

QUESTION: Well, what actions (inaudible) the Palestinians taken recently that would impede progress?

MR. KELLY: Well, as I say, we would discourage all unilateral actions, and I think --

QUESTION: Fair enough. But the Palestinians --

MR. KELLY: We talked yesterday --

QUESTION: -- don't appear to be taking any unilateral actions. It seems to be (inaudible).

MR. KELLY: Well, we did talk yesterday about the - and I want to make sure I get my language right here - about the - discouraging any kind of unilateral appeal for United Nations Security Council recognition of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. That would fall in that category of unilateral actions.

QUESTION: Okay. So the Palestinian call for this, which was rejected by both the EU and yourself yesterday, you're putting that on the same level as them building - as the Israelis building --

MR. KELLY: No, I'm not saying that. You just said that, Matt. I'm not saying that. I'm just saying that --

QUESTION: Well, you're saying you're calling on both sides to stop doing these things.

MR. KELLY: We are.

QUESTION: Yeah. But the rhetoric from the --

MR. KELLY: I'm not saying they're equivalent.

QUESTION: -- Palestinians is not actually constructed in a --

MR. KELLY: I'm not saying they're equivalent. I'm just saying that we - they - we have to treat these things as sensitive issues.

QUESTION: You said a little bit earlier that we understand the Israeli point of view on Jerusalem. Can you explain what you mean by that?

MR. KELLY: Well, you have to ask - I'm not going to stand up here and characterize the Israeli point of view on --

QUESTION: No. I'm just asking you, if you understand the Israeli point of view on Jerusalem, why are you saying that this is not a good thing?

MR. KELLY: I'm not saying we support the Israeli point of view. We understand it.

QUESTION: Right. And then, last one on this, you characterized this decision by the planning commission as dismaying.

MR. KELLY: Yes.

QUESTION: You can't come up with anything stronger than "dismaying"? I mean, this flies in the face of everything you've been talking about for months and months and months.

MR. KELLY: It's dismaying.

QUESTION: Yeah, you can't offer a condemnation of it or anything like that? (Laughter.) I mean, who is in charge of the language here.

MR. KELLY: I have said what I have said, Mr. Lee.
Yeah.

QUESTION: Would you say, though, that your own envoy has - does he have any leverage at this point, given the fact that the Israelis not only refuse, but blatantly have ignored his wishes on this?

MR. KELLY: Well, let's take a step back and let's also recognize that both sides agree on the goal, and that goal is a comprehensive peace. That goal is two states living side by side in peace and security and cooperation. So that is why we continue to be committed to this. That is why Special Envoy Mitchell meets with both sides at every opportunity, and why we are continuing to expend such efforts on this. So let's remember that, that we do share a common goal.

QUESTION: Well, where's Senator Mitchell today?

MR. KELLY: I believe Senator Mitchell is on his way back today.

QUESTION: Could you give us just a brief synopsis of the progress that Senator Mitchell has made in his months on the job?

MR. KELLY: Well, I think we have - we've gotten --

QUESTION: Yeah, maybe if the --

MR. KELLY: -- both sides to agree on this goal. We have gotten both sides --

QUESTION: Ian, they agreed on the goal years ago. I mean, that's not --

MR. KELLY: Well, I think that we - this government --

QUESTION: You mean you got the Israel Government to say, yes, we're willing to accept a Palestinian state? You got Netanyahu to say that, and that's his big accomplishment?

MR. KELLY: That is an accomplishment.

QUESTION: But previous Israeli administration - previous Israeli governments had agreed to that already.

MR. KELLY: Okay, all right.

QUESTION: So in other words, the bottom line is that, in the list of accomplishments that Mitchell has come up with or established since he started, is zero.

MR. KELLY: I wouldn't say zero.

QUESTION: Well, then what would you say it is?

MR. KELLY: Well, I would say that we've gotten both sides to commit to this goal. They have - we have - we've had a intensive round or rounds of negotiations, the President brought the two leaders together in New York. Look --

QUESTION: But wait, hold on. You haven't had any intense --

MR. KELLY: Obviously --

QUESTION: There haven't been any negotiations.

MR. KELLY: Obviously, we're not even in the red zone yet, okay.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. KELLY: I mean, we're not - but it's - we are less than a year into this Administration, and I think we've accomplished more over the last year than the previous administration did in eight years.

QUESTION: Well, I - really, because the previous administration actually had them sitting down talking to each other. You guys can't even get that far.

MR. KELLY: All right.

QUESTION: I'll drop it.

MR. KELLY: Give us a chance. Thank you, Matt.
Yeah, in the back.

QUESTION: It seems Senator Mitchell is focusing in his meetings on the Israeli side. Is he - does he have any plans to talk with the Palestinians, or there is no need now for that?

MR. KELLY: Well, he, as I say, he had meetings yesterday with the Israelis. He's coming back to the U.S. now. He always stands ready to talk to both sides. There are no plans at this moment to meet with the Palestinian side.

Wow. Impressive questions. Depressing responses.

-- Steve Clemons

Not a regular topic on the blog, but I really do love wildlife -- and being out in "it".

Although 600,000 others have seen this spell-binding video of National Geographic Paul Nicklen's encounter with a leopard seal, I had not seen it. I have watched it a half dozen times now.

The seal reminds me of a time when Oakley the Amazing Weimaraner (TWN regulars know him) used to catch birds and bring them to me -- once a duck, once a couple of pigeons, and once a dove. All survived, at least the first few flaps away from the dog.

So to lighten things up a bit as I get some other work done in Rome this evening, enjoy this clip.

-- Steve Clemons

In an apparent effort to dumb down the concept of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) for its readership, The Economist developed what it calls the "Big Mac Index."

I don't know how much a Big Mac costs in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, but I do know that you can't buy one at a McDonald's there.

As you can see from this picture I took in the Turkish part of Lefkosa (Nicosia), Cyprus, McDonald's is called "Bigmac" there. Not to be outdone, Turkish Cypriots can buy a Whopper at their local "Burger City."

According to the folks in Cyprus, the fast-food chains must take on pseudonyms because Greek Cypriots in the south own the exclusive rights to open franchises on the island.

-- Ben Katcher

This is a guest note by Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett. Flynt directs the New America Foundation/Iran Project and is a former Senior Director of Middle East Affairs at the National Security Council. Hillary is chairman of Stratega, a political risk consultancy. They are co-publishers of the new blog, The Race for Iran.

Yet again, U.S. officials, Western media, and various "experts" are telling us that Russia is finally coming on board for really tough sanctions against Iran over its nuclear activities. See, the latest media report on Russian President Dmitry Medvedev "joining forces" with President Obama on the need for tougher sanctions against Iran here.

Frankly, we've lost count of how many times U.S. officials, across the Clinton, George W. Bush, and, now, Obama Administrations, have claimed that, this time, Russia is really on board for severe sanctions against Iran. With the inauguration of Barack Obama at the beginning of this year, some observers speculated that America's "smart lawyer" President would find a soulmate in his newly installed and relatively liberal (by Russian standards) counterpart.

Many more commentators continue to trot out tired arguments about how Russia's interests overlap with America's with respect to not wanting Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, so, if the United States adopted a "smarter" Russia policy than that pursued by President George W. Bush, Moscow would eventually come around to the American position on sanctioning the Islamic Republic. For this camp, Obama's self-proclaimed interest in hitting the "reset button" with Moscow will surely facilitate closer Russian-American cooperation on the Iranian nuclear issue.

It is remarkable how such shallow analysis - fundamentally at odds with observed reality in multiple ways - continues to have considerable traction in public discussions of Iran policy in the West. First of all, the Obama Administration's efforts to hit the "reset button" with Moscow have not been all that adroit, particularly with Vice President Joseph Biden and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton popping up regularly to offer various anti-Russian statements, in contrast to President Obama's somewhat more disciplined approach to the English language (which may be why Obama has found it necessary to have five of his own meetings with Medvedev over the past ten months).

More importantly, as Dmitri Simes and Paul Saunders pointed out recently, "neither Barack Obama's charm nor appeals to common interests will persuade Russia's unsentimental leaders". In particular, Russia's posture toward the Islamic Republic is shaped by calculations about important economic, political, and strategic interests; these calculations are not going to shift dramatically simply because Prime Minister Vladimir Putin allowed Medvedev to take custody of the Kremlin keys.

What interests shape Russia's Iran policy? Most immediately, Moscow clearly attaches a high priority to keeping the Iranian nuclear issue in the United Nations Security Council--where, as a permanent member, Russia has considerable influence--because it is the only forum where Russia can at least potentially constrain U.S. unilateral action. Largely for this reason, Moscow has supported three sanctions resolutions against Iran over its nuclear activities since 2006. (These resolutions are available at The Race For Iran.)

However, on every one of these resolutions, Russia pushed back hard against British, French, and U.S. drafts to ensure that only narrowly focused measures (e.g., asset freezes and travel restrictions) targeting individuals and entities directly linked to Iran's nuclear and missile programs were authorized. By doing this, Moscow made sure that multilateral sanctions authorized by the Security Council would not impede Russia's pursuit of important longer-term economic, political, and strategic interests vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic.

Among these longer-term interests are selling nuclear and other high technology items and military systems to Iran, cooperating with Tehran to contain the spread of Sunni extremism in Russia's sphere of influence, and working with the Islamic Republic to weaken America's strategic position in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Moscow may well end up supporting another Security Council resolution expanding the existing sanctions regime against Iran - giving just enough to keep the United States from taking the issue out of the Council and forging a "coalition of the willing" or of the "like-minded". Beyond its interest in keeping the Iranian nuclear file in the Security Council, Moscow is not happy with Tehran's ambivalent reaction to a proposal that Russia helped to develop and advance, to refuel the Tehran Research Reactor using a significant portion of Iran's current stockpile of low-enriched uranium. Conversations with Russian officials suggest that Moscow may also be looking for ways to show displeasure with alleged Iranian slowness in making payments for various weapons purchases and (perhaps) on the Bushehr nuclear reactor project.

Furthermore, while Russia does not want to see a military confrontation between the United States (or Israel) and Iran, Moscow also does not want to see an overly rapid rapprochement between the United States (or Europe) and Iran. Among other considerations, Russian policymakers and the leadership of Gazprom are keen to prevent head-to-head competition between Russian and Iranian gas, especially in Europe.

These considerations notwithstanding, it remains highly unlikely that Russia will support proposals from the United States and its European partners to go beyond exclusively proliferation-focused sanctions and target key sectors of Iran's economy. To do so would put important Russian interests - including access to the Iranian market for high technology and military goods, strategic cooperation with Tehran, and the prospect that Gazprom and other Russian energy companies could develop upstream positions inside Iran.

The bottom line: whether with regard to prospects for Russian cooperation, prospects for Chinese cooperation, or the likely impact of additional sanctions on the Islamic Republic itself, the Obama Administration remains attached to a delusional sanctions policy.

-- Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Richard Lugar (R-IN) and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Howard Berman (D-CA) have jointly written a compelling case to end the travel ban for all Americans desiring to go to Cuba.

In fact, their piece, titled "Lift the Ban -- Let Americans Visit Cuba" really calls for ending travel restrictions on Americans going anywhere since Cuba is the only place in the world where America's democratic government restricts the travel freedom of its citizens.

It is a remarkable but true fact that the US government cannot stop regular Americans from traveling to North Korea, Burma, Iran, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Congo, or any other complicated place in the world -- except the one spot where the Cold War still freezes time -- Cuba.

The Lugar-Berman piece reflects a sensible bipartisan realism about the fact that five decades of an embargo have dramatically hurt US interests and have only perpetuated a dysfunctional status quo in US-Cuba relations.

President Obama constantly calls for serious bipartisanship in national security matters -- and he can pluck this Lugar-Berman prize off the tree easily if he has the will (and time on his overcrowded calendar). The House bill to end the travel ban to Cuba has been led by Congressman Bill Delahunt (D-MA) on the Dem side and Arizona Congressman Jeff Flake (R-AZ) who often says that it's supposed to be Communist governments, not Democratic ones, that impose restrictions on their citizen's choices to travel. The House Bill now has 180 cosponsors comprised of both Republicans and Democrats.

The companion Senate bill has 34 Senate cosponsors. Informal whip counts put the House bill at 205 votes -- within striking distance of the 218 needed, and between 61-64 in the Senate.

But thus far Barack Obama's team continues to condition any further openings to Cuba with a requirement that Cuba begin to demonstrate key political reforms on top of the fact that Obama's presidency has done the ironic thing of opening up travel for a "class" of Americans (those with Cuban relatives) while excluding all other Americans from that legal privilege -- I would actually say, "legal right". This exclusion of some but not all is something Obama should not want too long on his legacy sheet.

Lugar and Berman open:

U.S. law lets American citizens travel to any country on earth, friend or foe -- with one exception: Cuba. It's time for us to scrap this anachronistic ban, imposed during one of the chilliest periods of the Cold War.

Legislation to abolish restrictions on travel to Cuba has been introduced in both chambers of Congress. And on Thursday the House Foreign Affairs Committee will hold a hearing examining the rationale for the travel ban.

This ban has prevented contact between Cubans and ordinary Americans, who serve as ambassadors for the democratic values we hold dear. Such contact would help break Havana's chokehold on information about the outside world. And it would contribute to improving the image of the United States, particularly in Latin America, where the U.S. embargo on Cuba remains a centerpiece of anti-Washington grievances.

While opponents argue that repealing the travel ban would indicate approval of the Cuban human rights record, many human rights organizations -- among them Freedom House and Human Rights Watch -- have called for abolishing travel restrictions.

They go on to make the same point, namely " "isolation from outside visitors only strengthens the Castro regime," that former AEI neoconservative staffer and current Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw "Radek" Sikorski made in his own 2005 essay on Cuba in National Review. Bush Institute for Public Policy Director and former G.W. Bush administration Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy James Glassman has also argued that the travel ban and embargo undermine American interests.

It is through people to people exchange that both Cubans and Americans will become exposed to each other's worlds and political realities. They argue that more financial flow inside Cuba will strengthen the underground economy, a source of independence and potential liberalism inside Cuba.

Berman and Lugar state flat out with regard to the notion that restricting US travel to Cuba generates any leverage at all after five decades of failure on this track: "Conditionality is not leverage in this case."

The White House National Security Council staff reading this really should articulate a believable counter-point to Senator Lugar's and Chairman Berman's compelling argument if it is going to continue to 'cling to conditionality' before making further moves. What is the empirical basis for believing that putting Cuban responses before American interests will have any impact or makes sense?

Others who Barack Obama respects -- including former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Secretary of State and Treasury George P. Shultz -- have said that both the travel ban and the embargo make no sense as foreign policy. Shultz has called the travel ban "lunacy".

There are not many occasions when there is such a large squad of Democrats and Republicans in the same space.

Howard Berman is on board. Richard Lugar is on board. Many others are as well. Call John Kerry -- and I bet he's on board too.

It's the only course that ultimately makes sense. As David Rothkopf said at a Council on Foreign Relations meeting just before this past year's Summit of the Americas, US-Cuba relations are the "Edsel of US foreign policy."

It's time for Barack Obama to wake up on this and realize that he and his team are the outliers in a hefty and healthy bipartisan move in the Latin America portfolio.

-- Steve Clemons

I just published an article at The Daily Beast on White House Counsel Gregory Craig's resignation.

For the record, I am an admirer of Greg Craig's. I think that Craig is one of the few people on the progressive side of things who has a deep grasp of the complexities of America's GITMO problems hatched by the last administration. In my view, he is the White House lawyer tasked with closing GITMO, not the PR machine and political operator who was supposed to seduce Congress in permitting detainees to be moved into the justice and prison system of the United States. The President and White House Chief of Staff were AWOL when it came to laying the political groundwork for what Craig was tasked with doing.

Beyond the GITMO drama, I think that something else quite disconcerting has happened in the White House that was not happening during the Obama campaign.

The manner in which Greg Craig was undermined by leaks by senior White House colleagues seemed to have the President's tacit approval -- and this was something according to David Plouffe's new book, The Audacity to Win, would never have happened during the campaign.

In a "Team of Rivals White House", what happens when character assassination and leaks from within are given tacit support from those who hold the keys to the White House?

Here is the first part of "The Assassination of Greg Craig":

Gregory Craig, White House counsel to President Obama and national security advisor to Obama during the presidential campaign, resigned his post this past Friday. But when rumors broke Thursday of his imminent departure, Craig had not written his farewell note and may not have planned to leave - yet.

Since the summer, word had been leaking that Greg Craig's days were numbered and that Obama campaign legal counsel Bob Bauer would be moving in to take Craig's spot. But the situation seemed similar to the leaks about National Security Adviser Jim Jones' supposedly tenuous hold on his job--which were either untrue, or turned around by Jones' performance. The leaks about Craig also seemed unfounded--especially in light of direct statements from the White House that the statements were untrue and that he was not departing.

Some observers are now calling this incident the Obama team's first assassination by leak.

Such intrigue and innuendo stand in sharp contrast to the internal vow of key stakeholders in Barack Obama's campaign, as reported in David Plouffe's insider account Audacity to Win--whom he says vowed not to allow "@#%holes" and leaks and the blame game to disrupt any aspect of their campaign. When problems arose or mistakes were made, the president and his team were forthright and dealt with each other directly and confessed their sins, when they committed them, to the public.

The rest can be read here.

-- Steve Clemons

Update: Marc Ambinder has more well researched context on the back story of Gregory Craig's situation in the White House, which doesn't change the dynamic of 'assassination by leak' but does explain why Greg Craig was out of favor beyond the GITMO explanation -- which made no sense on its own. -- Steve Clemons

(Digital Globe-ISIS photo of Qom facility and tunnel entrances; courtesy ISIS)

The Institute for Science and International Security has just posted the just released IAEA reports on both Iran and Syria.

The Iran report titled "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran" can be IAEA_Report_Iran_16November2009pdf_1.pdf">read here as a pdf.

Pages 2-4 deal specifically with Qom and are interesting. Some clips worth highlighting are:

On the inspection of the site:

10. The DIV included a detailed visual examination of all areas of the plant, the taking of photographs of cascade piping and other process equipment, the taking of environmental samples and a detailed assessment of the design, configuration and capacity of the various plant components and systems. Iran provided access to all areas of the facility. The Agency confirmed that the plant corresponded with the design information provided by Iran and that the facility was at an advanced stage of construction, although no centrifuges had been introduced into the facility. Centrifuge mounting pads, header and sub-header pipes, water piping, electrical cables and cabinets had been put in place but were not yet connected; the passivation tanks, chemical traps, cold traps and cool boxes were also in place but had not been connected. In addition, a utilities building containing electricity transformers and water chillers had also been erected.

On Iran's stated rationale for the Qom facility:

"As a result of the augmentation of the threats of military attacks against Iran, the Islamic Republic of Iran decided to establish contingency centers for various organizations and activities ...

"The Natanz Enrichment Plant was among the targets threatened with military attacks. Therefore, the Atomic Energy Organization requested the Passive Defence Organization to allocate one of those aforementioned centers for the purpose of [a] contingency enrichment plant, so that the enrichment activities shall not be suspended in the case of any military attack. In this respect, the Fordow site, being one of those constructed and prepared centers, [was] allocated to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in the second half of 2007. The construction of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant then started. The construction is still ongoing. Thus the plant is not yet ready for operation and it is planned to be operational in 2011."

Iran states it has no other such facilities and IAEA states that Qom was a violation of agreement:

16. Iran stated that it did not have any other nuclear facilities that were currently under construction or in operation that had not yet been declared to the Agency. Iran also stated that any such future facilities would "be reported to the Agency according to Iran's obligations to the Agency". In a letter dated 6 November 2009, the Agency asked Iran to confirm that it had not taken a decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, any other nuclear facility which had not been declared to the Agency.

17. For reasons set out in previous reports to the Board of Governors, Iran remains bound by the revised Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to which it had agreed in 2003,7 which requires that the Agency be provided with preliminary design information about a new nuclear facility as soon as the decision to construct or to authorize construction of the facility is taken. The revised Code 3.1 also requires that Iran provide the Agency with further design information as the design is developed early in the project definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning phases.8 Even if, as stated by Iran, the decision to construct the new facility at the Fordow site was taken in the second half of 2007, Iran's failure to notify the Agency of the new facility until September 2009 was inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement.

Two important points made in the summary of the report focusing on lack of cooperation from Iran on other fronts are important to read:

35. Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities or its work on heavy water related projects as required by the Security Council.

36. Contrary to the request of the Board of Governors and the requirements of the Security Council, Iran has neither implemented the Additional Protocol nor cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues of concern, which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme. It is now well over a year since the Agency was last able to engage Iran in discussions about these outstanding issues. Unless Iran implements the Additional Protocol and, through substantive dialogue, clarifies the outstanding issues to the satisfaction of the Agency, the Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.

And the dance with Iran continues. . .

-- Steve Clemons

This is a guest note from Richard Vague's Delancey Place which ran on 16 November 2009.

In today's excerpt - for young George Washington, a father dying young, the resulting interruption of his education, and the dashing example of an older half-brother helped forge a burning ambition and determination:

"At his birth in 1732, George Washington's prospects were poor. He was a product of his father's second marriage. The sons from the first marriage, George's half-brothers, had been provided a formal education, including study abroad. They also received a bountiful inheritance when their father, Augustine Washington, died in 1743. But Augustine's demise appeared to stop George's ascent before it began. There was no money for continuing George's formal education, much less for sending him to England to complete his schooling, and his inheritance was meager. George received ten slaves and Ferry Farm, a worn-out tract across the Rappahannock River from Fredericksburg, Virginia. With that bequest he might become an important figure in King George County, though no one in the broader world would know him. But from an early age, George Washington wanted more. He wanted to stand apart from others. He wanted to be seen as a man of substance.

"George said almost nothing about his father, mentioning him in only three passing references in thousands of pages of correspondence. Augustine had accumulated a small fortune as a tobacco planter, land speculator, and proprietor of an iron forge, and he was a prominent figure in northern Virginia, where he held several local offices. Ambitious young males usually aspire to surpass the accomplishments of their fathers, and that appears to have been true of George. Yet it was not Augustine who was George's role model. It was Lawrence Washington, an older brother from their father's first marriage.

"Fourteen years older than George, Lawrence had studied in England. After returning home, he enlisted as an officer in a colonial army raised to fight alongside British regulars in a war with Spain, the oddly named War of Jenkins' Ear that erupted in 1739. Lawrence was sent to the Caribbean, then to South America, where he experienced combat. The war was a bloodbath for the American troops, and Lawrence was fortunate to survive and return home. Worldly, educated, well-to-do, dashing in his resplendent uniform, and deferred to as a hero by the most influential men and captivating women in Virginia, Lawrence cut an impressive figure.

"His stature increased when he was appointed adjutant general of Virginia, a post that made him the foremost soldier in the province. Soon, he was elected to the House of Burgesses, Virginia's assembly, a feat never realized by Augustine. The crowning touch came in 1743. Lawrence married into the Fairfax family, which claimed title to six million acres in Virginia and, needless to say, was the most prominent clan in the Northern Neck, the area around the Rappahannock and Potomac rivers. Lawrence and his bride took up residence on a lush green rolling estate overlooking the Potomac River. Having inherited the property from his father, Lawrence named his country farmhouse in honor of a British officer under whom he had recently served. He called it Mount Vernon."

John Ferling, The Ascent of George Washington: The Hidden Political Genius of an American Icon, Bloomsbury Press, Copyright 2009 by John Ferling, pp. 9-10, 13.

-- Richard Vague

For those who haven't seen it yet, CNN's Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank had an excellent piece air this weekend, detailing efforts by former Libyan terrorist leaders working with the Libyan government to convince jailed militants to renounce violence and al Qaeda for good.

The two-part video segment, the fruit of two years of research and reporting, follows the ongoing work by Saif al Islam al Gadhafi, the son of Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi, as well as Noman Benotman, a former senior commander in the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), to change the way jihad is practiced and turn Muslims away from terrorism. These efforts resulted in jailed LIFG leaders releasing new guidelines for waging jihad this past September; the weighty religious commentary, called "Corrective Studies," eschews terrorism and expressly forbids the killing of civilians.

Benotman is fascinating, a man who fought the communist Najibullah government in Afghanistan and came to know Osama bin Laden, before confronting the al Qaeda leader over terrorist bombings in 2000 and publicly criticizing al Qaeda in 2007. He also braved security restrictions in order to speak at the New America Foundation Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative's conference last month on the civilian dimensions of counterterrorism.

And as Cruickshank and Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Co-Director Peter Bergen pointed out in The New Republic last year, the efforts of Muslim leaders like Benotman and religious scholars such as the Saudi Sheikh Salman al-Ouda are crucial in convincing terrorists to abandon their struggle as well as stanching the flow of recruits to al Qaeda. These men and others like them have enormous credibility, from their time as militants or from the influence of their religious scholarship. As such, they can frame anti-terrorist arguments in a way that uniquely resonates throughout the Muslim world, whether in a Libyan jail cell or a London mosque.

When discussing those who had turned against al Qaeda, Bergen and Cruickshank write that:

Most of these clerics and former militants, of course, have not suddenly switched to particularly progressive forms of Islam or fallen in love with the United States...but their anti-Al Qaeda positions are making Americans safer. If this is a war of ideas, it is their ideas, not the West's, that matter. The U.S. government neither has the credibility nor the Islamic knowledge to effectively debate Al Qaeda leaders, but the clerics and militants who turned against them do.

We must remember that the most important weapon in the fight against terrorism might in fact be a Quran, rather than a predator drone.

-- Andrew Lebovich

I can't see this flag from my hotel window, but I could see it from the balcony of the Merit Hotel in Nicosia, Cyprus, where I attended a briefing today with Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister Dervis Eroglu.

The Turkish Cypriot national flag is embedded in the "five finger mountains" of Northern Cyprus. You can't quite make it out in the picture, but to the left of the flag is a smaller (but still enormous) Turkish national flag. The Turkish Cypriot flag is as long as four soccer fields and is supposedly the largest flag in the world.

Unfortunately, the likelihood that Greek Cypriot president Dimitris Christofias and Turkish Cypriot President Mehmet Ali Talat will reach a reunification agreement seems to be getting slimmer by the day.

The conventional wisdom here holds that if a deal is not struck by the end of the year, Talat is unlikely to win elections scheduled for May. The importance of striking a deal during Talat's term was underscored by former Turkish Cypriot hard-line President Rauf Denkta's statement this week that "If Talat and Christofias agree on a document, then we will know Talat has surrendered."

At today's press conference, Prime Minister Eroglu said ominously that "[Greek President Dimitris] Christofias is just another leader that follows strict policies...nothing changes."

Over the past day and a half, I have met with several high-ranking Turkish Cypriot officials and none of them have expressed any optimism that a deal will come soon.

I'll have more on this when I get back, but for those who can't wait I highly recommended this International Crisis Group report, "Cyprus: Reunification or Partition."

-- Ben Katcher

Recently, Cuba's Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez and US Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice went at it during a session when 187 Members of the United Nations were about to vote against the United States and two allies on the issue of the US embargo against Cuba.

Rodriguez said "President Obama has a historical opportunity to lead a change of policy toward Cuba and the lifting of the blockade", but also said "the blockade is an uncultured act of arrogance," "an act of genocide", and that the embargo was "ethically unacceptable".

I would have encouraged Cuba's foreign minister to say instead that the embargo was an anachronism of the Cold War, has not achieved the goals the US had for it, harmed both Cuban and US interests, and that the countries should realize its the 21st century and find a way to move forward.

But given the pitch of things that day at the UN, Ambassador Susan Rice threw some tough words back at Foreign Minister Rodriguez calling his remarks "straight out of the Cold War era" and "hostile."

She went on to underscore the more substantively important point that President Obama and the US were prepared to engage Cuba on a number of issues of mutual interest and concern. That at least is good news and really the only statement that mattered.

But theatrics and rhetoric aside, what is astonishingly absent from America's autopilot driven position on the Embargo is that with the end of the Cold War, Cuba is not exporting arms and revolutionaries -- Cuba is exporting doctors.

There are more than 51,000 Cuban doctors and health care professionals working around the world today, primarily in developing nations. Many of these are working collaboratively with US and European NGOs actually in third countries -- particularly in Africa in dealing with AIDS/HIV, river blindness, malaria, and a number of health maladies.

America and Cuba both maintain too much a habit of Cold War era rhetoric, but the facts on the ground are that Cuba is not a threat to the United States or its allies in any fundamental ways that justify the kind of barriers we have erected between Americans and Cubans -- at the government to government as well as at the people to people levels.

The other thing that US diplomats could do to constructively redirect a history of escalating, toxic public exchanges is to commend Bruno Rodriguez for his chapter in Cuba's "soft power" history.

In the Obama administration's roster of foreign policy practitioners today, people like Anne-Marie Slaughter, James Steinberg, Susan Rice, Samantha Power, Richard Holbrooke and others have done roll up their sleeves work in developing nations -- but I think all of them would admire the year of humanitarian service Bruno Rodriguez did on the Pakistan/Kashmir border.

To make a long and very fascinating story short, Fidel Castro organized a team of 1,500 doctors into the "Henry Reeves Brigade" and offered them to the US to provide support for victims of Hurricane Katrina. Predictably, the US declined the gesture. Shortly after, a major earthquake hit the heavily Islamic fundamentalist region along the border of Pakistan and Kashmir.

Castro sent the brigade to Pakistan to help earthquake survivors and those suffering long-term shock and other problems related to the earthquake in the months after.

The current Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez -- who was then a deputy foreign minister -- was dispatched along with the Reeves Brigade to oversee the medical operations in the mountainous, difficultly accessed earthquake zone.

Americans and Europeans also sent medical teams -- one major base camp each that stayed about a month each. The Cubans sent seven major base camps and thirty field hospitals, remaining for a year.

Reportedly, the Cubans, American and European medical personnel coordinated well in the field and worked together without incident. In one case, a Cuban doctor had to dress in a full hijab as a female doctor in order to deliver the baby of a local woman -- who would have been subjected to harsh punishment if known that a male doctor did this. But the Cubans did send many female doctors and health professionals as well.

At the time this all occurred, Pakistan and Cuba did not have diplomatic relations -- and today they do. And their are Cuban doctors doing work in Pakistan today -- and Pakistani students studying at the Latin American School of Medicine.

The Henry Reeves Brigade has, since Pakistan, been deployed to help in the great Sichuan Earthquake in China and also to do disaster relief in Latin America. The Brigade now has more than 3,000 health care professionals who are experts in disaster-related medical support.

This is a case of soft power with hard results, a story that anyone can commend despite all of the other warts and problems in a relationship. Americans and Cubans worked together to help others -- and nation to nation opportunities for Cuba and Pakistan grew out of that engagement.

It would be useful to see some of this kind of material make it into our diplomatic posturing as we work to get past the past.

The Cold War should be over, and once we begin to find narratives that can fill up the pages of the present and the future, that were not written as the result of inertia and being on auto-pilot, we can move to the next, more constructive phase in US-Cuba relations.

-- Steve Clemons

Some diplomacy data points I have picked up during my trip to Havana in the last couple of days:

~ There are 65% more non-immigrant visas processed by the US State Department for Cubans wanting to travel into the United States this year than last year.

~ The average non-immigrant visa profile is someone in their 70s going over to see relatives in the US

~ The backlog for non-immigrant visas in the US Interests Section (Embassy-lite) used to be more than 2 years, the longest in the world. The new head of the US Interests Section, Jonathan Farrar, worked with the Cubans who help staff a significant portion of his operation, and they added a "second shift" to process more visas each day. But now the demand is so large that even with the second shift, the backlog for visa interviews is two years and three months

~ The US Interests Section in Cuba is restricted in the bilateral agreements between Cuba and the US to 51 US government employees. In addition to these, the Havana-based representative of the US Department of State employs about 300 Cuban citizens to help in its consular work -- and these staff are managed and hired by Cuban government authorities.

~ If the travel ban on Americans traveling to Cuba is lifted, there will have to be a structural adjustment in the number of American diplomats permitted into Cuba. Some have suggested moving the number to 60 staff would work -- but given the broad opportunities for social, cultural, political and economic engagement, this writer thinks that an upward adjusted staff target should be about 75 US personnel.

~ Spouses of American diplomats assigned to Cuba can work at the Interests Section and not count against the personnel head count. The same is true of the Cuban Interests Section staff and spouses in Washington, DC.

~ Senior officials at the US Interests Section in Havana report to TWN that there is a marked, highly noticeable change in the attitude and "posture" of the Cuban government towards US State Department and other US officials assigned to the embassy-lite operation in Havana. They state that the Cuban authorities are constructively engaging with US government personnel -- and this just didn't happen before, according to them.

~ American officials were told by the Cuban government, however, that they could not attend an environmental summit in which several leading members of the Environmental Defense Fund from Washington attended. In contrast, there was a major agricultural products/economic fair this week which US government officials stationed at the Interests Section were permitted to attend. According the State Department, this is a welcome change in the climate which is less and less constrained.

~ US officials have also been permitted recently to begin visiting various Cuban-Americans held in Cuban prisons and to visit them as part of the consular duties of the Interests Section. This used to be off the list of what was permitted, but the Cuban government has become supportive of US contact with ten or so prisoners who have dual nationality.

~ The US government has had constructive meetings with Cuban government officials on migration (the first meeting hosted by the New School in New York City) and on direct mail service. Cuban government officials have informed TWN that there are a number of other key areas of "common interest" -- such as narcotics interdiction, alien smuggling, air traffic control, weather analysis and reporting, environmental policy that could be on the agenda as well -- but the Cubans report that the US has not yet responded.

~ On the subject of bilateral discussions on narcotics and drug smuggling, US government officials tell TWN that the US is actually quite interested and is still waiting for the Cuban government's proposal. (i.e., the ball is in Havana's court -- but I'm not sure Havana sees it that way)

For those who have the sense that things are not moving in the atmospherics of US-Cuba relations, that impression is wrong. Things have not stalled, at least from my perspective.

After discussions with both senior Cuban government officials and US officials, there is quite a bit of new opportunity, relaxed posturing, proposals, micro progress on a number of fronts that is not designed to be in the public eye or the media -- that is consistent with two parties who have long not trusted one another trying to construct a different kind of relationship that needs confidence-building steps and healthier interaction than has historically been the case.

There is much that could still take US-Cuba relations back off the rails again, as one diplomat said, but right now there is much that appears promising.

-- Steve Clemons

Poland's Foreign Minister Radoslaw "Radek" Sikorski, husband of Washington Post editorial writer (and Polish cuisine expert) Anne Applebaum, is a compelling, brilliant, eclectic political intellectual who I admire a great deal.

In part, I admire Sikorski because while tenacious and committed to his own analysis and views, he maintains an open mind; he listens; and while tenacious, he debates his intellectual opponents without going into the gutter. And he is occasionally unpredictable in all the right ways.

One way that he surprised me when he was running the New Atlantic Initiative at the American Enterprise Institute -- then the institutional beating heart of America's neoconservative movement -- he wrote a piece for National Review that called for an end to the US embargo of Cuba. It was called "Travels in Fidel-Land."

An expert in the illiberalism and despotism of the former Soviet empire, Sikorski had long argued that people to people contact, exchange, free commerce and the like open up a society and make it much more difficult for a dictatorship to remain in power.

Sikorski gets it. The intent of his article then was to focus on altering the internal dynamics of the Cuban state, but to do so not by overt meddling but from the power of the American marketplace and from the constructive collision of American liberal ideas with the hopes and aspirations of Cuban citizens.

From my progressive realist perch, I think that the US has tied itself into self-defeating knots with five decades of a failed embargo and a regime change obsession with Cuba that has gone nowhere.

I don't think that the embargo has produced results that have served the US national interest and have decreased American leverage in Cuba and Latin America. I think that removing restrictions on the freedom of Americans to travel and dropping the embargo eventually will have profound consequences on the political realities in Cuba and the United States. Both ways.

I don't share the objective that many neoconservatives, even Radek Sikorski, have of fundamentally altering the internal arrangements of other countries -- but I recognize that with an end to the embargo against Cuba -- what Cubans call "the blockade" -- that possibility exists and may even be probable. But that's not the wave of change that is the American government's right or role to surf -- it is the Cuban people's.

Here is a key clip from Sikorski's "Travels in Fidel Land":

The standoff between the U.S. and Cuba seems ultimately not just political, but also psychological. Cubans seem to think that they get noticed by big brother only when they stick him in the eye. Americans seem determined to put the little one in his place. How else do you explain the silliness of barring your citizens from visiting a country you are not actually at war with, or of imposing fines for importing Cuban cigars? We didn't cease to enjoy caviar even at the height of the Gulag.

The law should not be an ass, and the U.S. can afford to be pragmatic in its policy toward a country that no longer poses a threat. As Mark Falcoff points out in his brilliant Cuba: The Morning After, to keep the embargo while granting Cubans privileges in immigrating to the U.S. is politically self-contradictory: It gives the regime an excuse for failure while simultaneously helping it get rid of its internal opposition. . .

But if neither Old Europe's appeasement nor the U.S. embargo is likely to succeed in changing the regime, perhaps we need a coordinated transatlantic approach that would build on methods that have worked in the past. Human contact across the Iron Curtain was crucial in maintaining the conviction on the other side that democracy and free markets are superior to Communism: Fulbright scholarships that were granted to dissidents and nomenklatura alike helped to create alternative elites and weaned Communists off their zeal.

Sikorski has kept his own government of Poland on this track he articulated five years ago by instructing his Ministry's Ambassador to vote along with 184 other nations against the US Embargo of Cuba in the United Nations a week and a half ago.

-- Steve Clemons

What can the United States offer its allies? Throughout the Cold War, the answer was simple: the United States guaranteed its allies security from the Soviet Union. But this question - which seems so basic - is difficult to answer today.

It is undoubtedly true that the United States remains the predominant military power on Earth - and that countries as diverse as Canada, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Japan (along with many others) depend on American military power to provide security for international commerce as well as for baseline, worst-case scenario security guarantees. There is also little doubt that the United States obtains strategic benefits in exchange for these services in the form of energy supplies, cooperation against common threats, and more.

The problem is that this power - while immense - is not very fungible. That is, the United States cannot easily threaten to withhold a portion of its security guarantee or its protection of international waterways if (say) Turkey chooses not to support the United States' policy toward (say) Iran. Compounding the problem is that the worst-case scenarios in which American military power would be necessary are more difficult to imagine today.

This is an increasingly important problem as the United States tries to reorient its strategic objectives and relationships to address today's challenges.

Let me explain by way of the Turkish example.

During the Cold War, the United States and Turkey formed a "strategic partnership" based on both countries' fear of Soviet intervention in the Middle East. The Truman Doctrine offered a specific guarantee that both Turkey and Greece would be protected from Soviet aggression - a fear that was quite real in Turkey at the time. In exchange, the United States received access to military bases, support in the Korean War and a strategically advantageous position in the Middle East. Despite serious disagreements - particularly over Cyprus - the relationship worked to each sides' mutual advantage until the Berlin Wall fell 20 years ago.

Today, the United States wants Turkish support on a wide variety of important issues, including stabilizing Iraq, supporting the mission in Afghanistan, preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, moving energy to Europe, serving as a Muslim ally, and providing stability in its neighborhood.

In exchange, the United States offers security guarantees, military assistance, and the benefits that accrue from an alliance with the world' most powerful military. All of these things are very important to Turkey (and to many other countries). The problem is that the United States is not in a position to credibly threaten to withhold these benefits without undermining the international order in which it has invested so much. For example, both Washington and Ankara know that Turkey's stance on Iran's nuclear program will not jeopardize the American security blanket.

Of course, there are red lines that Turkey (or any other country) could cross that would change U.S. policy. But the point is that Turkey has a great deal of running room before those red lines are crossed. Turkey, both because it is a NATO ally and a strategically critical country, knows that it can pursue an independent foreign policy while still enjoying the benefits of American power.

From Tokyo to Paris - and many places in between - it is not so much the lack of American power that is the problem (it still has plenty), but rather the fact that its bargaining position is paradoxically undermined by its extraordinary role.

-- Ben Katcher

Jon Weinberg is a research intern at the New America Foundation/Middle East Task Force.

In a meeting with his Justice and Development (AK) party Sunday, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Prime Minister of Turkey, expressed that he prefers meeting Omar Hassan al-Bashir, President of the Sudan, to meeting Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel, despite the fact that the International Criminal Court has charged the former with war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Erdogan rationalized this preference by explaining that "I cannot discuss this with Netanyahu but I can easily discuss such issues with Omar al-Bashir. I can say to his face: What you are doing is wrong." This is hardly surprising considering Erdogan's public opposition to Operation Cast Lead, Israel's incursion into Gaza last December and January. During the World Economic Forum's Davos Conference in January, for instance, Erdogan walked out of a televised debate with Israeli President Shimon Peres after shouting "you're killing people."

On the other hand, the prime minister's declaration that "It is not possible for those who belong to the Muslim faith to carry out genocide" was rather tactless. It makes him sound naïve and feeds fears that the Islamic character of his AK party threatens the secular character of the Turkish republic.

Most importantly, it is unclear why Erdogan had to compare Israel to the Sudan in the first place. Cast Lead and the Darfur conflict differ greatly in size, scope, duration, and implementation. Erdogan could have simultaneously expressed his desire to maintain close ties with both Israel and the Sudan, as well as his concern for both countries' treatment of ethnic minorities without becoming a blatant apologist for one country and scathing critic of the other.

Earlier yesterday, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad "urged Turkey to maintain good relations with Israel, in order to mediate Damascus-Jerusalem peace negotiations." Regardless of what Israel has or has not done in Gaza, Erdogan risks Turkey's reputation as an honest broker and peacemaker if he continues to treat Middle East diplomacy as a zero-sum game between Israel and Muslim countries.

All told, in addition to other daring moves like excluding Israel from a NATO exercise in central Turkey last month, Erdogan's statements yesterday are emblematic of mounting tensions between Israel and Turkey - and perhaps indicative of a bigger shift in Turkish foreign policy.

-- Jon Weinberg

The comments on my blog have grown increasingly vile -- and are not in any way constructive, civil, fair-minded, or policy-oriented. I am turning them off. The primary violators of my policy know who they are. There are rampant ad hominem attacks on TWN now, comments about the personal lives and relations of other commenters.

This is unacceptable.

I'm off to Havana Cuba for a research trip for a few days and have no interest or time in playing hall monitor for folks who need to grow up.

I will consider turning the comments on if I receive apologies from those who have violated any sense of decency on this blog. I don't care about defensive rationales.

Comments closed. I hope I can turn them on in the future -- but that will not happen until I see a marked change in the behavior of nearly all of the lead posters.

I have emphasized over and over again that I am too busy to blog, do my New America Foundation work, and be a nanny for those who are not mature enough to be able to manage a civil discussion here.

Eventually, I will review the last few weeks of comments and remove every one of them that went over the line with extremely crass and demeaning language.

If you folks grow up, we can turn this on -- but it takes shared commitment and responsibility. I won't tolerate those who can't be civil -- on all sides of these debates.

Farewell to those who are offended.

-- Steve Clemons