I would suggest this has a lot more to do with Bush's meeting with Hakim, and his (our?)reported tilt towards SCRI. We are, as incredoulous as this sounds, lining up AGAINEST the interests of the Saudis. And Sunnis. So, therefore against the interests of Egypt, and Jordan, among other states. And as well, against the interests of Israel. To help Iran's man!!!!!! Bush has turned the world upside down. And shook it. No wonder, Baker, Scrowcroft, et al are upset. A lot of decades of American policy, perhaps, down the drain. All to cover dim son's ass.

Amazing. Reyes doesn't even know the composition or the sectarian alliances of the various entities that our government is presenting to us as "insurgents", "terrorists", and "allies". Rumsfeld can't even be bothered to read the ISG report, even though technically he is still Secretary of Defense. Bush, not only is choosing to ignore the suggestions of the ISG, (as he mines Washington for someone willing to tell him exactly what he wants to hear, so he can present it to us as a "new direction in Iraq"), but is completely oblivious to Baker's call for urgency.

Then you see the layers of intrigue, the carefully crafted plots and alliances, the cut-throat feints and charades, that are part and parcel of the Arab business and governmental processes.....

Bush and his crew are WAAAAAAY out of their league. The game of chess that Steve mentioned is ongoing, but we aren't even players anymore.

If you have a Hum-Vee in your driveway, I'd get rid of it. Today.

But don't sell your bicycles.

Steve:

This is the most realistic and plausible report you have written on this matter. Saudi politics shares a lots of the qualities of your average soap opera.

There are, however, still questions left to deal with. When are there not?

Which side in the Bandar/Turki rivalry was the source of the idea that the Saudis will intervene in Iraq after we pull out? Whose idea was it to put forth the proposal to lower oil prices in exchange for serious engagement by the U.S. in the MEPP (as if either is going to happen)? What did they hope to gain by it? What does it mean, in the Saudi context, to be "modern, reformist"? Is there any consideration given to the average Saudi's opinion on all this, or is that simply, as always, dismissed as irrelevant? Is it?

If your source is as good as you say it is, I'd appreciate some attention given to these questions. That would give us an idea, as well, as to the consequences of the BushCo relationship with the Royal family (or a faction thereof) and his protection of Saudi interests over and above those of the U.S., in violation of his oath of office.

Reads like a Verdi libretto. Lets hope its not going to turn into a Wagner.

Well, now we've heard one side of the story....

I'll bet that when we get the "Bandar" side, it will go something like this....

"Bandar was engaged in damage control -- Turki was being far too agressive in promoting his own personal vision of Saudi Arabia's interests, and Bandar was working to assure the US that Saudi and US interests still coincided. The recent Obaid column was the last straw -- it was authorized by Turki without the knowledge or consent of the king, and when the king found out about it, he 'recalled Turki for consultations' with the intention of replacing Turki as US ambassador, and giving Turki a sinecure inside the Foreign Ministry. Turki, knowing the humiliation he was about to suffer, resigned precipitously."

btw, there is a key contradiction in the "Turki" account... supposedly, Bandar was "jealous of the rave reviews" Turki was getting AND Turki was being "direct" with the administration while Bandar was being "syncophantic" toward Bush and Cheney.

Now, everything that we know about this administration points to "rave reviews" for syncophants, and rejection of those who are critical of administration policy. Thus, the "Bandar was jealous of Turki's rave reviews" doesn't really pass the sniff test, IMHO....

I like p.lukasiak's explanation. Turki El Faisal probably crossed the line between honesty and diplomacy. When Saudi money and arms are starting to flow to Iraq's Sunnis, it's best to deny it, not call attention to it or use it as a threat. Best reveal your cards very carefully when you're dealing with people as fundamentally duplicitous as Bush/Cheney. Apparently Bandar excelled at this game.

Well, since we are handicapping, I'll put my money on this version. Obaid article was Bandar plant. Its purpose was both to paint a terrible vision, and to stall the push to pull Americans troops out of Iraq that the Bush Admin, rightly, concluded will come in the wake of releasing the ISG Report. Turki, rightly concluding article could be pouring huge amount of gas on huge fire, fires Obaid. Bandar et al react to that firing by bringing Tirki home. Turki, FOR NOW, has lost the power struggle.

All speculation of course. But everyone else is doing it...and their track records are poor...so why not take a crack. The Saudis are playing a dangerous game, a bluff, if you will, at the behest of dim son. Other Saudis, rightly, have figured this out, and see the danger of the bluff becoming a self fulfilling prophecy. They are scared shit. As is Baker et al, the old guard. Dim son is pushing US (and perhaps, Saudis) into uncharted territory.

Screw the Saudi Royal family. Aren't they the ones funding all the madrassas that brainwashes Islamic youth into hating America? Saudi Arabia is not a democracy and we need to quit toadying up to them. And, yes, I do think the Bushes are way to close to them. Prince Bandar is like a family member of the Bushes.

Bandar et al react to that firing by bringing Tirki home.

while your speculation is entertaining, it rests on a false assumption -- that Bandar is Turki's boss, and had the power to "bring him home."

Unfortunately, Turki's boss--the head of the Saudi Foreign Service--is Turki's brother, the ailing Saud al-Faisal. Its thus extremely unlikely that Turki was "recalled" without the intercession of King Abdullah (or perhaps that of Crown Prince Sultan).

The rave reviews of Turki's performance in Washington, that supposedly irked Bandar, were coming from the Washington diplomatic community, not from the White House.

It's highly plausible that that the professional diplomatic corps have been more appreciative of Turki's style, skills, and sensibility than Bandar's.

robert morrow, is it possible your voice represents a special interest group? your comments on the rumsfield and these here seems to suggest as much.. >>I think Rummy is the best public servant in the USA in the past 20 years. He's sharp as a tack. I think invading Iraq was definitely the right move. And it might be time to take on Iran and Syria, too. If we don't, we might very well be looking at a LOT more dead Americans 5, 10 and 20 years from now. I think the neocons are spot on.
There is no such thing as a Maginot line in this age of nuclear weapons. And the Maginot line did not work anyway. So we have to wage preventive war. Call it imperialistic, call it the world's policeman ... I call it staying alive.

Posted by Robert Morrow at December 2, 2006 07:43 PM <<

"The rave reviews of Turki's performance in Washington, that supposedly irked Bandar, were coming from the Washington diplomatic community, not from the White House. "

Dave, this information is not contained in the article linked by Steve, and if you read what Steve wrote, the obvious conclusion is that the rave reviews were coming from the administration (i.e. according to Steve's account, Bandar's "jealous" reaction to the rave reviews was "continuing to manage his own White House relations and contacts THROUGHOUT BUSH WORLD") (emphasis added with caps, since italics seem to be impossible here).

So if you have a link to something that says that Bandar was jealous of Turki's reputation within the DC diplomatic corps as a whole, I'd appreciate it.

Good thread. I'm impressed with the focused discussion that actually transcends Steve's original post.

I have very little to add, but I will offer an observation or two.

1) All too often in Arab politics, the western designations of 'moderate' and 'reformer' are all but meaningless and simply means 'the guy we like, as opposed to the other guys.'

2) I'm not sure as to the relevance of 'rave reviews', this is a diplomat not an off broadway production. In this context, the Ambassador must satisfy or deal with multiple constituencies... first and foremost, he must reflect the position of his homeland. Leveraging an embassadorial position to affect domestic politics is a risky and occasionally fatal thing. He has to represent that position to other nations, particularly the host nation.

In this context, Turki's sudden departure suggests that either his government had lost faith in him, or that he had lost faith in his government. Either way, it suggests a disconnect between Turki and Saudi Arabian policies and positions. This doesn't mean that personal issues, vis a vis Bandar are not at play. They doubtless are. But they may translate to significant policy differences.

Overall, this suggests less a bunfight than a power struggle in the house of Saud. How personal is it? What are the externalities? Are the Saudi's uniform in their view as to foreign policy, or will the outcomes shift that foreign policy.

I'd draw an inference that the current long period of stable Saudi foreign policy has been the result of a long period of drift and compromise, both internal and external circumstances depict that this may be coming to an end and that any new configuration will see radical and perhaps unhappy changes in policy.

Just some thoughts.

Word of the day: "ZAKAT"

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20061208/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_insurgency_saudi&printer=1

I wholly agree with the final paragraph of Den Valdron's analysis. The current, aged king of Saudi Arabia is not one of the powerful Sudeiri clan. The aged and ailing Crown Prince and aged Prince Nayef are. Under the Saudi practices for accession to the throne, the status of Crown Prince does not guarantee accession. Next in line to the throne may be Nayef, allegedly a funder of Palestinian suicide bombing efforts and dominant force behind the throne - not a modernizing influence in the present.

Cautionary tale of the power of the religious establishment in Saudi Arabia and its hostility to classical liberalism here:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talal_bin_Abdul_Aziz_al-Saud

Another reasoned analysis from Robert Morrow. I would to read it in its original crayon.

So, throwing your lot in with Bush and Cheney is the wrong move? Who knew?!

It does sound like an internal palace fight. Seems I remember several years ago that one of the Saudi Prince cousins was knocked off in a mysterious manner and speculation was that it came from conflicting family members.

"a long period of drift and compromise"

Den, that pretty much sums up Saudi policy on anything since the Kingdom was founded.

Next, PUBLIUS, your analysis of Saudi succession does not match what I have witnessed.

Here is how the Saudi succession process works:

Succession occurs when the King dies. Regardless of the miracles of modern medicine, the moment of the King's death is unpredictable and sudden.

So, the transfer of power from the King to the Crown Prince is immediate and automatic. In some cases, the King's health is such that the Crown Prince has been running the home office, anyway, and the change is largely one of title. On that day, the old King is buried in an unmarked grave in the Negev desert, per Wahabi tradition, and the family fans out to hold majlisaat, where every adult male citizen comes to swear fealty to the new King -- and the Family.

There then follows the real decision, in the making of which the senior members of the Family can take their time, once the continuing legitimacy and control of the Family is assured. That is the naming of the Crown Prince. I don't know your background and sources, but the status of Crown Prince is all about the guaranteed and immediate succession. I was in Saudi during one such event, and observed what took place; that is the source of my information.

Remember also, that succession has nothing to do with primogeniture. There are two brothers (sons of Abd-al-Aziz) older than Abdullah (Bandar and Mus'aid), one other older than Sultan (Mishaal), and five more older than Nayef. The youngest son of Abd-al-Aziz (Muqran) is "only" 61, about the same age as Turki! Bets on the name of the next Crown Prince are all long shots, but it should stay with the "sons of AA" for some time yet, a fact that no doubt pisses off the Sudeiri Seven no end.

As to the significance, or not, of the Turki/Bandar dispute, if any, and the Obeid article, I'm without the direct access I enjoyed while serving in Jidda, so I won't claim to have a clue, nor will I speculate. Except to doubt that when it comes down to it, anyone will do anything after all.

Here's the thing when your policy if founded on drift and compromise. When the currents get shaky, then so does the policy.

There's a lot of turbulence in the middle east right now, and just about all of it is attributable, directly or indirectly to the United States - Directly in the Iraq debacle, the mass movement of 1.6 million refugees into Syria and Jordan, and the ongoing quasi-confrontation with Iran; indirectly in greenlighting the disastrous Lebanon war, and the war on Hamas.

Drift is fine, in a stable situation. The middle east is now in the rapids. Which means that the new Saudi drift and compromise probably isn't going to be pleasant. Rather, its likely to be dramatic, changeable, extremely erratic and somewhat violent.

And that, ladies and gentlemen, is as far as I want to push the metaphor.

p.lukasiak

Yes, you are correct. I operate under the assumption that whoever works, and lives, outside the Saudi Kingdom has somebody inside the Kingdom who can call him home. Yes, that is my assumption. As a general proposition I don't think any Ambassador, Saudi or otherwise, is 'too powerful' to be called home. It is not in the nature of the job.

David Noziglia:

In a hurry, but the custom of primogeniture is inapposite here. Agreed. I never suggested otherwise and, in fact, implied the opposite: unpredictability in the path of Saudi Arabian succession due to vast dynastic politicking.

2) The succession following the death of King Fahd only sheds limited light on future successions. Drawing conclusions on the basis of that one unique experience is risky. This is a relatively young kingdom, and Fahd's death was anticipated for years. Mechanisms were in place to replace him with a presumably healthy and lucid sovereign. As noted above, today's heir presumptive is no Crown Prince Abdallah.

3) Moreover, as pointed out by Den Valdron and the article on zakat, very different currents are flowing in the Middle East and in Saudi Arabia than obtained in the last decade.

4) Anyone seen the latest Zogby poll on Usama bin Laden's popularity in the Saudi Arabian grassroots or its merchant class or among the lesser princes and sheikhas? Trick question. There isn't one. You're also not going to get that kind of data in the company of the dominant dynastic elements.

Man, how do you get this level of postings on your blog? I almost get as much out of the comments as I do from the posts.

"Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and (de facto) the 14 March Bloc in Lebanon are ranged against Iran, Shiite Iraq, Syria, Hizbullah and Hamas. Neither Israel nor Saudi Arabia can openly admit to the tacit alliance for fear of anger from their own publics because of objectionable parties to it. But this is how things are shaking out.

Now the Saudis are openly saying that this new Cold War in the region could turn hot. If you don't own a bicycle, I'd buy one, because a regional war of the sort Saudi Arabia said it feared would potentially cut off 20 percent of the world's petroleum." --Juan Cole

Is there any evidence that the proposed troop increase is in response to the Saudi ultimatum?
Is this a reasonable inference?

In response to succession posts, submit that risks akin to those between two of Abdul Aziz's sons, Faisal and Saud, which culminated in 1964 with Saud being deposed and Faisal declared king, has been intentionally lessened with the establishment of the Bay'ah Council by HRH Abdullah. See:

Solving the Saudi Succession Puzzle
Thomas W. Lippman
Saudi-US Relations Information Service (SUSRIS)
December 6, 2006

Snippet of interest to me:

Now King Abdullah has established a more formal system. He created a committee of princes, called the �Allegiance Institution,� to designate future crown princes. Because Sultan has already been chosen as next in line after Abdullah, the new system will take effect only after Sultan becomes king. Once that happens, and in all future cases, the new king is to nominate one, two or three candidates to be his successor. Committee members may accept a nominee or reject all three. �If the committee rejects all the nominees, it will name a Crown Prince whom it considers to be suitable,� according to a translation provided by the embassy.

This process is to be completed within 30 days. In the past, long intervals of uncertainty have sometimes ensued as a new king has delayed naming a successor.

Perhaps more important, the new law specifies the procedures to be followed if the king is incapacitated. This is clearly intended to avoid a repetition of the uncomfortable period between 1995 and 2005, when Fahd was disabled by a stroke. �Abdullah was de facto ruler, but his power was limited because he was not king; many important reforms were delayed or set aside because of that vacuum.

Some Saudis have said the new law is important also for what it does not say. There is no mention of the country�s religious leadership, or ulema. The law does not preclude consultation with the religious leadership, traditional partners in power of the House of Saud, but neither does it command it. Some analysts believe this is part of a gradual process in which the senior princes have been almost imperceptibly separating their power from the often troublesome input of the ulema.

Gordon Housworth

http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/articles/2006/ioi/061206-lippman-succession.html

"Is this a reasonable inference?"

No, but it is within the limits of "reasonable speculation" here at Steve's ;)

My neighbor, a retired Navy officer, who specialized in intelligence, says that we should impliment a phased withdrawal of troops in Iraq.

He thinks that during the next month or two we should take out one American division and make the Iraqis replace it. Later, take out another division and so on until we are out.

He ended his career in Afghanistan, has many friends in Iraq, and said that adding more troops (where will they come from?) is a recipe for disaster. Over 70% of the Iraqis want us out.

He says that if the Iraqis are determined to have a civil war (and he believes they are), we should get out of their way.

He says that if the Iraqis are determined to have a civil war (and he believes they are), we should get out of their way.

I'm sorry, but this kind of thinking really bothers me. Sunnis and Shia in Iraq aren't like two drunks in a bar who have been itching for a fight, and eyeing each other all night. While there may be a small minority that want "civil war", the vast majority of Iraqis simply want to be able to feed their families, and walk down the street without fear.

The key to understanding the dynamic in Iraq is that EVERYONE thinks they are involved in a "defensive" war at this point -- but that different groups think they are fighting different wars.

What you have is Sunnis and Shia's each afraid of a resolution that results in their subjugation, US forces "defending" itself against the terrorist threat, and foreign/al Qeada inspired groups "defending Islam" from "The Great Satan".

This idea that "Iraqis want civil war" is, at its heart, racist, because it fails to recognize that Iraqis are no different than anyone else, and prefer to live peaceful prosperous lives even if it means "the enemy" is also living peaceful prosperous lives.

"The key to understanding the dynamic in Iraq is that EVERYONE thinks they are involved in a "defensive" war at this point -- but that different groups think they are fighting different wars."

In the Russian Civil War there were a lot of factions fighting for a lot of different things. In the Ukraine the Greens were fighting for the independence of their country from Russia. The White armies were a mixed bag in the extreme, encompassing Cossacks, Democrats, Tsarists and even legions of Czech soldiers fighting largely to get home. Much of the fighting was also done by little more than glorified groups of bandits, out for what they could get.

This description bears a pretty striking resemblence to Iraq. Many other civil wars have also been fought with similar chaos and localised agenda.

Harvard professor Monica Toft suggests there are six objective criteria all modern civil wars share:

the struggle for power over which group governs the country;

at least two organised, armed, groups of combatants;

that the “state” is formally involved in the fighting;

the intensity of the conflict;

that the two groups are each taking significant numbers of casualties;

and that the fighting is within the boundaries of a single country.

She believes Iraq meets all six criteria.

"This idea that "Iraqis want civil war" is, at its heart, racist"

I don't think my neighbor is a racist. He tends to describe himself as a realist.

I wouldn't be surprised if the Saudi clerics who called on Sunni Muslims around the world to mobilise against Shi'ites in Iraq did so prompted by Bandar. In fact, when Nawaf Obaid wrote in The Washington Post that the Saudi leadership was preparing to revise its Iraq policy whether he was not doing so at the instigation of Bandar. Obaid indicated that the opinions expressed were his own and not those of the Saudi government.

Bandar had a secret meeting with Olmert in Amman at the end of September, supposedly to get Israel to discuss peace in the region. He is believed to have done so with the knowledge of King Abdullah. Was it really so? At that point though, the ISG report had not been made public and the "rapprochement" with Iran so to speak was not yet on the table.

When it became fairly obvious that Bush might support the Shi'ites (with Iran's help) instead of the Sunnis, Olmert started his European tour to convince the leaders there to ostracize Iran. Perhaps the Saudi government was not moving fast enough for its part and Bandar (who of all Saudis has been the closest to the Israelis and let's not forget, the pro-war neocons) gave events a push. Coincidentally, there have been reports that his wife, the King's daughter, had been courting the Wahhab clerics for a long time. Given the power that the clerics have over the monarchy, it is not surprising to see why.

One thing that would be interesting to know is whether the Saudi government expressed its view of intervention in Iraq should the US troops leave before or after the clerics called on their brethrens to mobilise against the Shi'ites in which case that could be considered "damage control" on the part of the government. It could explain also why the ambassador had to rush back. He certainly cannot oversee the clerics (and the Bandar couple) from Washington!

One thing is certain. Very interesting things have been happening in the kingdom lately like a new Constitution.

http://www.asharqalawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=2&id=6847

Hicks faces new hurdle
Email Print Normal font Large font Jane Holroyd
December 14, 2006 - 3:49PM

Advertisement
AdvertisementDavid Hicks' fight for freedom from Guantanamo Bay has been dealt another blow after a US federal court judge upheld a law passed recently by the Bush administration that stops foreigners in overseas military prisons from challenging their imprisonment in US courts.

Yemeni national Salim Ahmed Hamdan, who has been held at Guantanamo Bay since mid-2002, lost a bid to challenge his detention after US District Judge James Robertson ruled today (Australian time) that he no longer had jurisdiction to hear Hamdan's case.

Judge Robertson said that the new Military Commissions Act was designed to keep such challenges out of US courts.

"This is the first time in the history of this country that a court has held that a man may be held by our government in a place where no law applies," a US lawyer for Hamdan said in response to the loss.

David Hicks' Adelaide-based lawyer David McLeod said the ruling was another "bump" along his client's road to justice.

He said Australia's Attorney-General Philip Ruddock had repeatedly referred to the US courts as a safeguard for Guantanamo detainees to challenge their detention.

"Now that safety net no longer exists," Mr McLeod told theage.com.au.

"(This) is another bump on a long road to restoring rights and the rule of law."

David Hicks' father Terry said he was disgusted by the Military Commissions Act, signed by US President George Bush in October.

"(It's) absolutely disgusting," Mr Hicks told theage.com.au.

He said the new law was designed to rush his son and other Guantanamo Bay detainees into trials before military commissions, which he said were unfair.

"It's like they're saying, 'Let's just make this ruling regardless that puts them back into the field of the commissions, and find them all guilty and jail them for the rest of their lives'."

"They're not worried about the David Hicks or the others in Guantanamo Bay," Mr Hicks said.

He said Judge Robertson's ruling quashed habeas corpus - the right to go before a court and to not be detained indefinitely.

Salim Ahmed Hamdan, formerly a driver for Osama bin Laden, had earlier won a historic Supreme Court ruling that struck down the legality of the military commission system created by Bush.

But the Military Commissions Act authorised by Congress in October established new military commissions.

theage.com.au, with AP

Something I wonder about--maybe you all have an answer. Assuming that it's valid to describe Turki as a modernist/realist and Bandar as something of a good old boy--what is the difference (if any) between their visions for Iraq--or the whole region for that matter? What do they see as a desirable outcome and how do they propose to get there?

You know, if the entire world isn't laughing at us by now, they should be. I realize that there ain't much to laugh about when the world's so called "last remaining superpower" is managing to slaughter people at an exponentially increasing rate, due to incompetence and it's tenacious inability to abandon failed policy....

But....

Who can help but chuckle when some Pelosi nominated asshole, Reyes, who should know better, utters some ridiculous inanity like....

"I know what Hezbollah is, what they're about. I'm probably one of the few members of congress to go through a Hezbollah checkpoint on the road between Damascus and Beirut."

Whats he know??? The color of their uniforms??? Gads, these are the geniuses that are going to rescue us from this Bush created clusterfuck that threatens to shatter the already tenuous "stability" of the entire Middle East?

One thing about Bush, he managed to put people in place that have to PROVE to us that they were inept and unqualified. But Pelosi is trying the more direct route, she is going to eliminate any suprises her committee nominees may inflict upon us. She is going to put in place people that we know are inept and unqualified before they even start their jobs.

Like I said, don't sell your bicycles.

http://www.elpasotimes.com/election/ci_4829044

TG:

The answer to your question is very simple. "Good ole boys" don't care about competence and results when the interests of the general public they are a part of are on the line. Desirable outcomes are thus tied to "what's in it for me and my clique."

Two very interesting, albeit dated, reports:

http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/03/09/13/97433.html

Ironically, the "Red Prince" is the father of one of the world's richest men and one of its foremost capitalists who also happens to want better understanding between the West and the Muslim world:

http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/newsletter2005/saudi-relations-interest-01-31.html

Why hasn't Bush engaged with such forces in the Saud dynasty? See explanation of "good ole boys" above. Plutocrats vs. democrats. The Federalist Papers were written for good reason.

PUBLIUS:

We pretty much agree on everything but the succession mechanism. It is interesting that the succession I witnessed was not the death of Fahd, but the death of Khalid, and Fahd becoming king (that's how old I am) in 1982. You are confused because the same thing happened both times, thus increasing the sample size by 100% (said with a chuckle, please).

My point is that the Family realizes that the cusp of a succession is a very vulnerable time for their rule, and though they may bicker among themselves, they all recognize that in a time of vulnerability, they have to circle the camels, as it were. There can be no bickering over the naming of the king, because if that happens, the Ulema' and other suppressed groups could seize the opportunity.

As you point out, the Family does not base its rule or legitimacy on its popularity. They know they are vulnerable, and they know the basis of their rule and wealth can be overturned in a heartbeat -- or lack of one.

Which bears on the idea of their "drift." Remember, the only way to avoid making a bad decision, is not to make any decision at all. Which the Saudis have raised to an art form. Basically, money is their answer to everything. They fact that circumstances have changed, and things are more unstable, only reinforces this instinct.

I may also point out that even twenty-five or so years ago, it was common knowledge that every Saudi in the middle- to upper-class with any money at all (including the Family, but others besides) maintained substantial bank accounts in Florida, Zurich, the Bahamas, or wherever. They were ready to get on their private plane and head for one of their spare houses in a flash, because they knew -- and they still know -- that the family business known as the Kingdom could come crashing down any second.

The one controlling principle for governance in the Middle East, indeed the world, is paranoia.

"Our Arab region is besieged by a number of dangers, as if it was a powder keg waiting for a spark to explode." --Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah

http://www.kuwaittimes.net/Navariednews.asp?dismode=article&artid=240430439

His remarks were not fit to print in the Western media, but were picked up in China and the ME, per my Google news search.

Does anyone else think it's beginning to feel like June, 1914?

"Does anyone else think it's beginning to feel like June, 1914?"

Yeah, Richard Holbrooke:

The Guns Of August

By Richard Holbrooke
Thursday, August 10, 2006

Two full-blown crises, in Lebanon and Iraq, are merging into a single emergency. A chain reaction could spread quickly almost anywhere between Cairo and Bombay. Turkey is talking openly of invading northern Iraq to deal with Kurdish terrorists based there. Syria could easily get pulled into the war in southern Lebanon. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are under pressure from jihadists to support Hezbollah, even though the governments in Cairo and Riyadh hate that organization. Afghanistan accuses Pakistan of giving shelter to al-Qaeda and the Taliban; there is constant fighting on both sides of that border. NATO's own war in Afghanistan is not going well. India talks of taking punitive action against Pakistan for allegedly being behind the Bombay bombings. Uzbekistan is a repressive dictatorship with a growing Islamic resistance.

The only beneficiaries of this chaos are Iran, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda and the Iraqi Shiite leader Moqtada al-Sadr, who last week held the largest anti-American, anti-Israel demonstration in the world in the very heart of Baghdad, even as 6,000 additional U.S. troops were rushing into the city to "prevent" a civil war that has already begun.

This combination of combustible elements poses the greatest threat to global stability since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, history's only nuclear superpower confrontation. The Cuba crisis, although immensely dangerous, was comparatively simple: It came down to two leaders and no war. In 13 days of brilliant diplomacy, John F. Kennedy induced Nikita Khrushchev to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba.

Kennedy was deeply influenced by Barbara Tuchman's classic, "The Guns of August," which recounted how a seemingly isolated event 92 summers ago -- an assassination in Sarajevo by a Serb terrorist -- set off a chain reaction that led in just a few weeks to World War I. There are vast differences between that August and this one. But Tuchman ended her book with a sentence that resonates in this summer of crisis: "The nations were caught in a trap, a trap made during the first thirty days out of battles that failed to be decisive, a trap from which there was, and has been, no exit."

Preventing just such a trap must be the highest priority of American policy. Unfortunately, there is little public sign that the president and his top advisers recognize how close we are to a chain reaction, or that they have any larger strategy beyond tactical actions.

Under the universally accepted doctrine of self-defense, which is embodied in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, there is no question that Israel has a legitimate right to take action against a group that has sworn to destroy it and had hidden some 13,000 missiles in southern Lebanon. In these circumstances, American support for Israel is essential, as it has been since the time of Truman; if Washington abandoned Jerusalem, the very existence of the Jewish state could be jeopardized, and the world crisis whose early phase we are now in would quickly get far worse. The United States must continue to make clear that it is ready to come to Israel's defense, both with American diplomacy and, as necessary, with military equipment.

But the United States must also understand, and deal with, the wider consequences of its own actions and public statements, which have caused an unprecedented decline in America's position in much of the world and are provoking dangerous new anti-American coalitions and encouraging a new generation of terrorists. American disengagement from active Middle East diplomacy since 2001 has led to greater violence and a decline in U.S. influence. Others have been eager to fill the vacuum. (Note the sudden emergence of France as a key player in the current burst of diplomacy.)

American policy has had the unintended, but entirely predictable, effect of pushing our enemies closer together. Throughout the region, Sunnis and Shiites have put aside their hatred of each other just long enough to join in shaking their fists -- or doing worse -- at the United States and Israel. Meanwhile, in Baghdad, our troops are coming under attack by both sides -- Shiite militias and Sunni insurgents. If this continues, the U.S. presence in Baghdad has no future.

President Bush owes it to the nation, and especially the troops who risk their lives every day, to reexamine his policies. For starters, he should redeploy some U.S. troops into the safer northern areas of Iraq to serve as a buffer between the increasingly agitated Turks and the restive, independence-minded Kurds. Given the new situation, such a redeployment to Kurdish areas and a phased drawdown elsewhere -- with no final decision yet as to a full withdrawal from Iraq -- is fully justified. At the same time, we should send more troops to Afghanistan, where the situation has deteriorated even as the Pentagon is reducing U.S. troop levels -- which is read in the region as a sign of declining U.S. interest in Afghanistan.

On the diplomatic front, the United States cannot abandon the field to other nations (not even France!) or the United Nations. Every secretary of state from Henry Kissinger to Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright negotiated with Syria, including those Republican icons George Shultz and James Baker. Why won't this administration follow suit, in full consultation with Israel at every step? This would clearly be in Israel's interest. Instead, administration officials refuse direct talks and say publicly, "Syria knows what it must do" -- a statement that denies the very point of diplomacy.

The same is true of talks with Iran, although these would be more difficult. Why has the world's leading nation stood aside for over five years and allowed the international dialogue with Tehran to be conducted by Europeans, the Chinese and the United Nations? And why has that dialogue been restricted to the nuclear issue -- vitally important, to be sure, but not as urgent at this moment as Iran's sponsorship and arming of Hezbollah and its support of actions against U.S. forces in Iraq?

Containing the violence must be Washington's first priority. Finding a stable and secure solution that protects Israel must follow. Then must come the unwinding of America's disastrous entanglement in Iraq in a manner that is not a complete humiliation and does not lead to even greater turmoil. All of this will take sustained high-level diplomacy -- precisely what the American administration has avoided in the Middle East. Washington has, or at least used to have, leverage over the more moderate Arab states; it should use it again, in the closest consultation with and on behalf of Israel.

And we must be ready for unexpected problems that will test us; they could come in Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, Syria, Jordan or even Somalia -- but one thing seems sure: They will come. Without a new, comprehensive strategy based on our most urgent national security needs -- as opposed to a muddled version of Wilsonianism -- this crisis is almost certain to worsen and spread.

1. King Abdullah is country founder Abdul Aziz/Ibn Saud's oldest surviving son. Three brothers - Bandar, Musaid and Mishaal are older than crown prince Sultan.
2. Bandar ibn Sultan, former ambassador to DC, is son of Crown prince Sultan and is married to Turki Al Faisal's sister.
3. Turki Al Faisal is part of a coalition, that includes his seven brothers, senior Princes, Bandar and Mishaal, and a coterie of other royals that have backed Abdullah in MOST of his attempts to consolidate power/influence and balancing this with the so-called influence of the Sudairi clan.
4. The Sudairi clan's power is diminshing because (in order)
a) Fahd is dead
b) Crown Prince Sultan is ailing
c) Prince Abdel Rahman has objected to full brother Naif supplanting his right to succession.
d) Prince Naif has not been able to find the support to line him as 2nd Deputy Premier.
e) Prince Turki is a non issue
f) Prince Salman has lost his interest in succession though is pushing his sons into the limelight.
g) Prince Ahmed will not get the support as long as Naif is trying.
h) Generally speaking, the most prominent grandsons of the Sudairis have shown greed as their primary attribute and therefore do not have the support of most Saudis.

Turki al Faisal remains a VERY important prince whether in Washington or in Riyadh. Bandar's influence with Dubya aside, his star in political Riyadh is totally dependent not on his father's support but his credibility with Abdullah -he has no influence among the Saudi intelligensia. Turki, on the other hand, has not only a track record of above board accomplishments (even though the media (??) blamed him for the growth of Al Qaeda), but the support of his immediate family and, more importantly, support on the streets of Riyadh, Jeddah and Dammam among both the conservatives and the progressives -no mean task in that part of the world.