On
“Some people have the possibility to build consensus,
others operate in other ways.” -- Adamantios Vassilakis, Ambassador for
“He marches to a different drum and the drum is out of
tune.” -- Jack Pritchard, special envoy for negotiations with
“He lives in
another world, with this belief that he is morally superior, and the
“He's a real force here, but in a way that provokes a lot of reaction and opposition from others. What you needed was an ambassador who would heal, not deepen, rifts." – Mark Malloch Brown, Deputy Secretary General[iv]
“The job now is to get clarity on what the U.S. wants.’’ – Emyr Jones Parry, British Ambassador, after Bolton abruptly rejected the Human Rights Council document after skipping meetings and failing to inform negotiators about “deal breakers”[v]
“We’re not in favor of holding any individual
items, or the budget, hostage to other issues.
The EU position is that we want the budget adopted the normal way.” –
Emyr Jones Parry, British Ambassador, rejecting
“We didn’t even have the opportunity to discuss it. We had no chance to express our views, and I
am confident if we had had such a meeting we would have been able to come up
with a balanced text. This is the way the Security Council ... has always
functioned.” -- Algerian Ambassador Abdallah Baali, blaming Bolton’s
brusqueness for failing to secure a condemnation of a suicide attack on
“
“The General Assembly has generally felt that its power and
its influence is being diminished.” – Kofi Annan, on suspicions by many
countries that
Bolton on the UN:
“It’s a target-rich environment.” – On what he had enjoyed most about working at the UN[x]
“The U.N. is one of
many competitors in a marketplace of global problem solving." –
Bolton, describing why the
“He did not see or understand that the UN was only an instrument of American policy, not the policy itself…He forgot that the UN was an instrument to be used to advance America’s foreign policy interests, not to engage in international social work” – On Bill Clinton’s crucial mistake[xi]
“He is not the president of the world. He is not a diplomat for all seasons. He is not Mr. Friend of the Earth. And, most definitely of all, he is not the commander in chief of the World Federalist Army. He is the chief administrative officer. Nothing less than that, to be sure, but, with even greater certainty, nothing
more.” – On the UN Secretary General[xii]
“The UN is only a tool, not a theology. It is one of several options we have, and it is certainly not invariably the most important one.” [xiii]
“The
danger of the ‘multilateral temptation’ is that one will resort to the U.N.
reflexively. That reduces
“While treaties may well be politically or even morally binding, they are
not legally obligatory. They are just not “law” as we apprehend the
term. And what happens to countries when they do not adhere to international
law on some matter? Usually nothing. Why, then, do we continue to talk about
international “law”? Because the word has a strong emotive appeal.” – On why
international law does not exist[xv]
“For 50 years on a bipartisan basis, we have tried to keep
the UN out of the
“If you lost ten stories today, it wouldn't make a bit of difference. The United Nations is one of the most inefficient, intergovernmental organizations going. UNESCO is even worse, and others go downhill from there. The fact of the matter is that the international system that has grown up…has been put into a position of hiring ineffective people who do ineffective things, that have no real world impact.” – On the UN[xvii]
“There is no United Nations. There is an international
community that occasionally can be led by the only real power left in the
world, and that’s the
Bolton on Multilateralism
and International Law:
“It is a big
mistake for us to grant any validity to international law even when it may seem
in our short-term interest to do so - because, over the long term, the
goal of those who think that international law really means anything are those
who want to constrict the
“War is often an entirely rational calculation, and preventive diplomacy can no more stop it than it can reverse the power of gravity.” – On why preventative diplomacy does not work[xx]
“The key to the administration’s fondness for “multilateralism” is that such an approach offers cover and allows the White House to duck tough decisions.” -- On why multilateralism equals cowardice[xxi]
“Harder to understand [than Annan’s motives] is why the
Bolton’s Management Style:
“He is a quintessential kiss-up, kick-down sort of guy.
There are a lot of them around. I'm sure you've met them. But the fact is that he stands out, that he's
got a bigger kick and it gets bigger and stronger the further down the
bureaucracy he's kicking.” -- Carl Ford, Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research, on
“That's simply not good government. It's not excellence in
government. It's a serial abuser.” – Carl Ford, on
“He was so far over the line that he’s one of the, sort of,
memorable moments in my career.” – Carl Ford, describing the “tongue lashing”
“He is incapable of
listening to people and taking into account their views. He would be an
abysmal ambassador.” -- Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, Colin Powell’s chief of
staff, describing
“I differ from a lot of people in Washington, both friend and foe of Under Secretary
Bolton, as to his ‘brilliance.’ I didn't
see it. I saw a man who counted beans, who said, ‘98 today, 99 tomorrow, 100
the next day,’ and had no willingness -- and, in many cases, no capacity -- to
understand the other things that were happening around those beans. And that is
just a recipe for problems at the United Nations.” -- Colonel Lawrence
Wilkerson, on
“He
was yelling and screaming, and red in the face, and wagging his finger. I'll
never forget the wagging of the finger. That's perhaps his style.” – Christian
Westermann, intelligence analyst, on Bolton’s demeanor when Westermann told him
the intelligence community did not agree with his language on
Bolton’s Handling of
Intelligence
“I left that meeting with the perception that I had been
asked for the first time to fire an intelligence analyst for what he had said.”
– Carl Ford, on Bolton’s request that an intelligence analyst be removed when
his views clashed with
“Chilling.” – Carl Ford, describing the effect of
“It’s perfectly all right for a policymaker to express
disagreement with an NIO or an analyst, and it’s perfectly all right for them
to challenge such an individual vigorously, challenge their work vigorously.
But I think it’s different to then request, because of the disagreement, that
the person be transferred.” – John McLaughlin, Deputy Director for Central
Intelligence, on
“Disagreements
or different viewpoints on analysis do not constitute pressure. It's the threat
of my job, the removal and the continued sanctioned [sic] that I found to be
pressure.” – Christian Westermann, on
“Hell.” – Melody Townsel, USAID Employee/Subcontractor,
describing her life after
“Truth flew out the window.” -- Melody Townsel, on
“Quite
the contrary. I worked harder to get him promoted than any other officers that
I think has ever worked for me.” – Stuart Cohen, National Intelligence Council
Vice Chair, on whether he disciplined an analyst
“He didn’t agree with the views they
were expressing.” – John Wolf, Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation, when
asked what
“John strongly believed that just
because the intelligence community had a
conclusion on an issue, that didn’t necessarily have to be his view… in other words, John felt he had every right to interpret what the evidence meant and come to a different conclusion than the intelligence community.” -- Alan Foley, former head of the CIA’s weapons proliferation center[xxix]
“Let’s say
that he took isolated facts and made much more of them to build a case than I thought the
intelligence warranted. It was a sort of cherry-picking of little factoids and
little isolated bits that were drawn out to present the starkest-possible
case.”[xxx]
-- Robert Hutchins, former chairman of the National Intelligence
Council, describing clashes with Bolton over
“We think the only way at this
point to mitigate the damage to the United Nations is that the Secretary
General Kofi Annan, we think has to personally and publicly repudiate this
speech at the earliest possible opportunity. Because otherwise I fear the
consequences, not just for the reform effort, but for the organization as a
whole.” –
“Let
me just give some advice to the Secretariat to remind them how this process
works in
“This
is a red pen, and I will draw
the red lines for this negotiation right now.” –
“You
have no standing here.” –
“I brought the gavel down at 10. I was the only one in the room, though.” – On instituting “discipline” during his term as President of the Security Council, by beginning meetings with only himself present[xxxv]
“I
think it’s not very polite to start with 11 or 12. The form is important. You
are working when you have the 15 members in the room ambassadors or not
ambassadors, but (every) seat occupied by the members.” –
“The
“I’m not much of a carrots man.” – Bolton, undercutting
Secretary Rice’s efforts to open dialogue with
“Our experience has been that when there is a dramatic
change in the life of a country, that’s the most likely point at which they
give up nuclear weapons.” – Bolton, endorsing regime change in
[i]“U.N. action on
[ii] “
[iii]“U.N. action on
[iv]Bolton Struggles to Steer UN Toward
[v] “
[vi] “Bolton in a
[vii] “
[viii]“Bolton in a
[ix] “UN chief concerned with tensions between UN organs,”
Xinhua General News Service, 2-20-2006.
[x]“UN ignored corruption findings, claims
[xi] John Bolton, “The Creation, Fall, Rise, and Fall of
the United Nations,” Delusions of
Grandeur: The United Nations and Global
Intervention, Cato, 1997.
[xii] John Bolton, “The Creation, Fall, Rise, and Fall of
the United Nations,” Delusions of
Grandeur: The United Nations and Global
Intervention, Cato, 1997.
[xiii] John Bolton, “The Creation, Fall, Rise, and Fall of
the United Nations,” Delusions of
Grandeur: The United Nations and Global
Intervention, Cato, 1997.
[xiv] John Bolton, “The Creation, Fall, Rise, and Fall of
the United Nations,” Delusions of
Grandeur: The United Nations and Global
Intervention, Cato, 1997.
[xv]John Bolton, “The Global Prosecutors; Hunting War
Criminals in the Name of Utopia,” Foreign
Affairs, 1-1999.
[xvi] John Bolton, “Equal Time,” MSNBC, 10-13-2000.
[xvii]John Bolton, Speech to Global Structures Convocation,
[xviii]John Bolton, Speech to Global Structures Convocation,
[xix] “Just What is a War Criminal?,” Insight on the News, 8-02-1999.
[xx]Testimony before House Subcommittee on International
Operations and Human Rights,” 9-20-2000.
[xxi]“Kofi Hour,” Weekly Standard, March 9, 1998.
[xxii] John Bolton, “Kofi Hour,” Weekly Standard, 3-09-1998.
[xxiii]“Delay is Sought in Vote,” New York Times, 4-19-2005.
[xxiv]Senate Foreign Relations Committee Testimony,
4-12-2005.
[xxv] “Interview With John McLaughlin With Regard to the
Bolton Nomination,”
[xxvi]“Letter to Senate Foreign Relations Committee”
4-15-2005.
[xxvii] Stuart Cohen, “Interview With Stuart Cohen With Regard
to the Bolton Nomination,”
[xxviii] ibid.
[xxix] “Interview With Alan Foley With Regard to the Bolton
Nomination,”
[xxx] Interview With Robert Hutchins With Regard to the
Bolton Nomination,”
[xxxi]“Media Stakeout With Ambassador John Bolton,” Federal News
Service, 6-7-2006)
[xxxii]“The Future of the U.S. Relationship With the United
Nations,” Centre for Policy Studies, 6-08-2006, http://www.cps.org.uk/pdf/lec/68.pdf
.
[xxxiii] “Day to Day,” NPR, 12-30-2005.
[xxxiv] “Bolton in a
[xxxv] “World Briefing,”
[xxxvi]“Behind the Scenes,” AP, 3-25-2006.
[xxxvii] “AMB.
[xxxviii]“Your World,” Fox News, 5-31-2006.
[xxxix] “Bolton rejects ‘grand bargain’ with