EuropeÕs Evolving Stakes in the Middle East
Speech
by Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, MEP
at the
New
America Foundation
Washington,
D.C., October 6, 2006
session chair
Steven Clemons, Director, American Strategy Program, New America
Foundation
-----------
If we look at
the Middle East today, some facts seem to be taken for granted that just a few
years ago would have been unthinkable. The EU leads the negotiations with Iran
over that countryÕs nuclear program. European forces are stationed in Southern
Lebanon, Europeans have the command of UNIFIL. The Israeli Prime Minister
invites German soldiers to the Israeli border. Presidents Abbas and Assad are
all over the European media.
The question,
then, is: What does it all mean? Is it serious? Has something really changed or
is this just a temporary phenomenon? The jury is still out on these questions
but there are some elements that seem to indicate a more lasting involvement.
I will talk
about the area we call the ÒNear EastÓ in German, i.e. Israel, Palestine, Syria
and Lebanon. The German ÒMiddle
EastÓ, i.e. Iran and Iraq will be touched upon only when it is needed. However,
ÒMiddle EastÓ is used throughout the text in the American meaning, i.e.
encompassing the entire region.
EuropeÕs
position in the Middle East has traditionally been difficult.
When we look at
Europe and the ME we should realize that substantial political involvement of
EuropeÕs in the region is rather recent. Until 17 years ago, Europe herself was
the center of the major political conflict, the Cold War.
Also, there have
been different traditions and preferences inside the EU when it came to dealing
with the countries of the region. Germany had a special relationship with
Israel, whereas France, Italy and Britain had a colonial past. The consequences
of this can still be seen in the current Lebanon crisis, in which France
thought of herself as the protector of Lebanon.
This has also
led to a certain mistrust on the Israeli side regarding European involvement.
At the EC summit
in Venice in 1980, the then-EC called for the recognition of the rights of the
Palestinians. Israel was furious, turned away from Europe and, the US as the
main protector was also the main, sometimes even the sole interlocutor for
Israel on political issues.
The main
alternative, however, at that time, was not the EU but the Soviet Union of
course, that sponsored Arab countries politically, economically and militarily.
And of course,
there were many on the left in Europe who did not mind Soviet involvement and
had great sympathy for the plight of the Palestinians. Some, like Joschka
Fischer, even attended Arab meetings that advocated the annihilation of Israel.
Fortunately,
things have changed. Not only the Joschka Fischers of this world have long
since come to their senses, but the Soviet Union has disappeared as well. And
it was really only after the end of the Cold War that there was a chance for
Europe to become a serious political actor in the region. Suddenly, it proved
difficult that Israel was perceived to have but one major ally and the Arabs
were left without substantial support from anywhere. Neither Iran nor the Gulf
states could really make up for MoscowÕs demise.
So, in the
1990s, things changed. Still, Europe could not go from zero to full involvement
in a short period of time. Therefore, the European Union`s activities continued
to be mainly in the form of humanitarian aid and development assistance. In
effect, the entire Palestinian Authority all but depended on EU money. The
same, by the way, goes for UNRWA.
Now, that
doesnÕt make for great political clout, one may say, and there is certainly
something to that argument.
The option of
influence lay solely in the possibility to cut this aid. But thatÕs not so bad;
the results can currently be seen in the Palestinian territories, where the
lack of money has the effect of banging heads together in order for Hamas to
cooperate with Fatah.
Also, it was
mainly the EU«s longstanding financial engagement that made it a natural part
of the Quartet. In that context, two things were remarkable: a) The EU was
represented by one person, i.e. Javier Solana and b) the Quartet strived for a
real solution, giving the EU a seat at the political negotiating table.
So, with the
Quartet, EuropeÕs involvement became serious and lasting. It was all the more
disappointing therefore, to see the Roadmap fail. This disappointment has led
to a feeling in the broader population that we shouldnÕt be engaged in the
region, really. When I talk to voters about this, they believe that corruption
and violence in the Palestinian territories are endemic. Specifically, EU funds
are said to have been abused to support terroristsÕ families. But make no
mistake about it, IsraelÕs policies are not exactly popular either, the more
hawkish, the less popular.
The question
people are asking is: Are we not moving into an area in which we will be confronted
only with losing propositions? Are we not trying to do the impossible, achieve
the unachievable? Should we not leave it to the US and look after other regions
of the world? After all, how likely is Hamas to recognize Israel in all honesty?
How likely is Iran to give up its nuclear enrichment program?
They also point
out that there is a limit to how much they are willing to pay, and wait, and
see, as happened in the Palestinian case. There is a limit as to how many
destroyed buildings, airports and roads Europe is willing to reconstruct. The
airport in Gaza was built with taxpayersÕ money from my German home state
– and was destroyed by the Israeli air force. Not a good scenario either.
And now, Lebanon.
The decision by
the European countries to send troops to Lebanon reflects the conclusion that
only a strong political involvement in a conflict – embodied in the use
of military forces – will allow Europe decisively to influence the
outcome of a conflict. It is also the answer to the sceptical voices, to the
ÒisolationistÓ streak, that Europe is willing to put up a serious effort.
For Germany,
specifically, a military mission close to the Israeli border is a historic
novelty, to say the least. There was a lively debate, as you can imagine,
whether the country that perpetrated the Holocaust could move into an area in
which its soldiers might be forced to shoot at IDF members. This discussion
took an interesting turn when Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert invited German
soldiers to help secure the Israeli border and disarm Hezbollah. This was a
difficult invitation. If Germany was to participate in such a mission, it was
to implement UNSCR 1701, not to protect a party to the conflict. On the other
hand, it is part of GermanyÕs raison dÕŽtat to
help secure IsraelÕs right to existence. Yet another part of German raison
dÕŽtat, however, is to strengthen and support the
United Nations. The way out of this dilemma was found with Germany sending
naval forces to guard LebanonÕs seashore against weapons smuggling by
Hezbollah. Still, 2/3 of the German public is opposed to a mission where German
soldiers might have to shoot at Israeli soldiers.
The willingness
of European nations to risk their troops in one of the most dangerous regions
in the world clearly means that EuropeÕs engagement in the future of the
Israeli-Arab conflict has moved to a new level. Financial means and political
brains are now backed up by military muscle.
Let me take a
step back for a minute and look at the decision in the context of the evolving
European Foreign and Security Policy. Many were surprised at EuropeÕs
apparently sudden appetite for risk. However, if you take the time to look more
carefully at what Europe has been doing in the field of security and defence,
the planned European military engagement in the Middle East is a logical step
in the context of a maturing EU foreign policy. The first involvement of
European soldiers came a mere three years ago, in Macedonia. Since then, Europe
has participated in 14 different missions around the globe, including
Indonesia's Aceh province, the province of Transdniestria at the border between
Moldova and the Ukraine and a larger mission in the Congo, which is now being
increased. The EU has 6.000 troops in Bosnia; in 2003 the EU sent 1.200 troops
to Bunia, in the Eastern Congo, to stop the worst atrocities there; it is now
again in the DRC with over 2.000 troops supporting the UN mission there and
making sure the electoral process proceeds smoothly; in Afghanistan, European
NATO troops have been leading the extension of the Alliance into the East of
the country. In short, Europe has become one of the main global actors in peace
keeping. Often European involvement in peace keeping missions is disguised by
going in under a non-EU flag, mainly the UN or NATO.
So, Europe has
been acquiring the operational experience (be it in an EU or NATO context) and
Europe has a doctrine – Ôeffective multilateralismÕ. And despite the
strong rift in the EU during the Iraq war, Europe has been fairly unified when
it came to the Lebanon war, except as far as the timing of the ceasefire was
concerned. Britain and Germany were pitted against France in that question. But
still, France came out with a statement that they wanted to lead the UNIFIL.
Although France and other countries felt that the UN mandate only gave very
vague rules of engagement that might even endanger their soldiers, France and
Italy decided to send 2.000 and 3.000 soldiers respectively.
This development
is also a new and more robust form of international burden-sharing between the
US and the EU. Militarily, I believe the US cannot act in the ÒNear EastÓ area.
Its soldiers would be seen as a party to the conflict, they would be easy
targets for terrorists. UN forces from remote places alone cannot do it either,
as was amply shown during the years since UNSCR 1559 with the continuous
shelling of northern Israel from Southern Lebanon.
This
burden-sharing must over time lead to a responsibility sharing as well. And
this brings me to the question of the political solution. There are a number of
important questions, the first one being: What do we want? That is not
difficult to determine. A two-state solution between Israel and Palestine with
a viable Palestinian State, not a series of isolated Bantustans; peace in the
area between Israel, Syria and Lebanon; an end to terrorism in the region which
will probably only be achievable if Iranian influence is rolled back. And of
course, we need democracy in the area which is just as difficult a challenge as
is peace. Still we should not lose sight of the goal.
The second
question we have to answer is: Who do we talk to? Can we talk to Hamas, can we
talk to Hezbollah, can we talk to Syria?
LetÕs start with
Syria. I believe that the continued isolation of Syria will prove to be
counterproductive. Syria and Israel need come to a peace deal. Syria currently
sees itself more isolated than ever. Even Arabs friendly to the idea of the
destruction of Israel, are unhappy with Syria doing this on the back of the
Lebanese people. "Syria is fighting Israel to the last Lebanese" is
the word on the street in Aman and Cairo. In an interview in the Spanish
newspaper El Pais on Monday President Assad said he was prepared to resume
peace talks with Israel within 6 months. A solution to the Sheba'a Farms issue,
disarming Hezbollah, and clarifying once and for all what the role of Syria is
vis-ˆ-vis a sovereign Lebanon: under these conditions a deal is possible that
is sorely needed. In a way, I believe it is ironic that we talk to Iran despite
its policies because of its nuclear program but refuse to do so regarding
Damascus.
Hamas and
Hezbollah are more difficult. Scholars of the region point out that it will be
utterly impossible to achieve a lasting solution without the involvement of
modern Islamist movements. They point to the fact that unlike Al-Qaeda both
Hamas and Hezbollah have a military and a political arm (much like the IRA and
Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland). Both participate in electoral processes –
where they have more to fear from winning than from losing, but that may be a
useful lesson. As for Hamas – their electoral platform was: ÒThe party of
reformÓ – The Fatah platform was ÒThe party of the martyrs.Ó But we will
talk to Fatah only. That is difficult to explain. Now, does Hamas have to
recognize Israel? Absolutely. Do they have to renounce violence? Absolutely. Do
they have to respect the accords signed by the PLO? Yes, they do. Do they have
to do it before one starts to talk to them. This is a crucial and a difficult
question. But finding an answer to it should not be an insurmountable obstacle.
And, make no mistake about it, peace with Syria alone is not going to solve
IsraelÕs existential question of how to live safely next to the Palestinians
– the two processes must at the very least go hand-in-hand.
Hezbollah is
perhaps more difficult even than Hamas. But here also, they do not pursue a
nihilistic campaign of the Al-Qaeda kind. Are they terrorists? They are. But
they are a political force as well. They have two ministers in the Lebanese
government, after all. Was Arafat a terrorist? He sure was. But he was the sole
partner capable of delivering the Palestinians, despite his past as a
terrorist, his role as the instigator of the second intifada, despite his mind-boggling
corruption and all the other things that could rightfully be laid at his
doorstep.
It may be too
early but we will have to look at Islamism with a more discriminating eye than
we have in the last few years. More often than not, Islam is the only avenue
for political opposition. The governments in the region can and often do
withhold all basic civil rights – but they cannot close the mosques or
outlaw Islam. Voters are also often less radical than party members. A
significant part of Hamas voters favors the recognition of Israel, some even
say a majority does.
The third
question is: Who needs to be involved, and the answer is obvious: Europe cannot
do it alone, just as the US canÕt. However, these days European engagement is
stronger than American one and I hope that this is going to change after Secretary
RiceÕs trip to the region. We need the US to be involved again. We need to
revive the Quartet with substantial US input.
The key word behind
this is of course ÔEffective MultilateralismÕ, i.e. the doctrine adopted by the
EU in 2003 for international affairs. Of course, we wish for a world in which
countries bind themselves into a network of laws, obligations and institutions,
like the EU itself. By projecting the European vision of rules-based,
predictable and institutionalised international relations, the EU is hoping to solve
problems and, yes, increase its global influence. But a doctrine alone is not
going to solve any problems. The political will to back it up is also needed.
Today, Europeans are willing to use military force in the Middle East to back
up their vision. This is clearly not the end of it, much remains to be done,
but it is a difference and I hope and believe that it will make a difference
– for the Middle East, for the EU and for a world of effective
multilateralism.
Thank you very
much.
For More Information, contact:
Steven Clemons
New America Foundation
1630 Connecticut Avneue, NW, 7th Floor
Washington, DC 20009
202-986-2700
202-986-3696 fax
clemons@newamerica.net